Liberty University Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 4

September 2015

The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench: Exploring the Case
for Intelligent Design
Johnny Rex Buckles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review

Recommended Citation
Buckles, Johnny Rex (2015) "The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench: Exploring the Case for
Intelligent Design," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol3/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars
Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars
Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MONKEY
WRENCH: EXPLORING THE CASE FOR
INTELLIGENT DESIGN
Johnny Rex Bucklesl
ABSTRACT

Teaching intelligent design in public schools has become an extremely
controversial and highly publicized educational prospect that is just
beginning to gamer judicial attention. This Article argues that a proper
resolution of the constitutional problems raised by teaching intelligent
design requires both a precise understanding of intelligent design and
evolutionary theory, and a sophisticated grasp of theological conceptions of
the origin and development of life. After explaining these important
foundational concepts and surveying the most relevant Supreme Court
precedent, this Article discusses two important threshold questions that
arise from the origins debate. First, is intelligent design theory inherently
religious? Second, must science refrain from referring to supernatural
causation? Answering each question in the negative, this Article then
sketches the analysis necessary for determining the constitutionality of a
state actor's decision to permit, require, or forbid the teaching of intelligent
design in public school science classes.
I. INTRODUCTION

Intelligent design, a complementary strand of theories advanced by a
budding cadre of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers, has
catalyzed a keenly intellectual, deeply passionate, and widespread debate.'
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Mary
Woodard, Stephen Cox, and Kang Chen for their able research assistance, and research
librarians Adrienne Cobb, Peter Egler, and Christopher Dykes for procuring titles. I thank
Professors Martin Belsky and William S. Brewbaker III, and Casey Luskin, for comments to
drafts of this Article. I also thank the University of Houston for its financial support of this
project. Finally, I thank my wife, Tami, for her constant support.
1. The literature advancing intelligent design has been described as "sophisticated,
vast, and growing." FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, & PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN 92 (2003). For
collections of essays advancing and critiquing intelligent design, see DARWINISM, DESIGN,
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer eds., 2003); DEBATING
DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO DNA (William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., 2004)

[hereinafter

DEBATING DESIGN];

and

INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS:

(Robert T. Pennock ed., 2001)
[hereinafter INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS]. For a collection of essays
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Drawing on physical evidence and information theory, intelligent design
theorists maintain that naturalistic explanations alone cannot account fully
for what is observable in nature, particularly life and its complexity.2 This
argument is perceived to challenge both the modem philosophical premises
of scientific exploration and certain views of life's origins and
development embraced by most natural scientists (especially evolutionary
biologists). If conventional assumptions about the nature of science
comprise the modem machine of the natural sciences, intelligent design
aspires to be the most significant monkey wrench ever tossed into this
machine.
With so much at stake, seemingly everyone has opined on intelligent
design.4 From the Oval Office5 to the Vatican,6 supporters and opponents
of intelligent design appear at every turn. Further, such "turns" are many.
The President's friendly face towards intelligent design was promptly
followed by an official cold shoulder from his science advisor.7 Science
written solely by intelligent design theorists and proponents, see MERE CREATION: SCIENCE,
FAITH & INTELLIGENT DESIGN (William A. Dembski ed., 1998) [hereinafter MERE

For a brief introduction to the theory of intelligent design, as well as its asserted
empirical basis, see BECKWITH, supra, at 106-17; and David K. DeWolf, Stephen C. Meyer
& Mark Edward DeForrest, Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or Religion, or
CREATION].

Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 59-66.

2. For a succinct explanation of intelligent design, see infra Part II.A.2.
3. The reigning philosophical assumption of science is methodological naturalism. For
a discussion of methodological naturalism, see infra Part IV.B. For a critique of
philosophical naturalism in general, and methodological naturalism in particular, see the
collection of essays published in NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (William Lane Craig

& J.P. Moreland eds., 2000).
4. See Lisa Anderson, Evolution of Intelligent Design, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2005, § 1, at
1 ("A decade ago most Americans had never heard of intelligent design, or ID. But, in the
last year, the term has surfaced repeatedly in politics, media and education ....
").
5. President Bush has stated that schools should teach both intelligent design and
evolution to expose students to differing perspectives. See Johanna Neuman, Inspirationfor
Doubtersof Darwin, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A12.

6. Pope Benedict has called creation an "intelligent project" and criticized those who
argue for a creation lacking direction and order. See World in Brief WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
2005, at A23. However, the official Vatican newspaper recently published the views of an
evolutionary biology professor who characterized intelligent design as unscientific. See Ian
Fisher & Cornelia Dean, In "Design" vs. Darwinism, Darwin Wins Point in Rome, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at A12.
7. The day after the President's statement, presidential science advisor John Marburger
remarked that "intelligent design is not a scientific concept." Charles C. Haynes, First
Amendment Ctr., PoliticalScience: Unintelligent Debate over Intelligent Design, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 22, 2005, available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
commentary.aspx?id=15678 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
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standards favoring the teaching of challenges to evolutionary theory in
Kansas public schools were famously adopted, jettisoned, revised, revived,
and further amended in response to several elections.8 Ohio recently has
witnessed a similar schizophrenia in the formulation of its public school
science standards.9 Equally well known is the changing of the guard of
Dover, Pennsylvania's local school board, which passed a controversial
policy requiring teachers to notify biology students of the existence of
intelligent design.'0 The policy prompted the litigation in Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District,11 the first judicial opinion in American history
to consider intelligent design theory.
Kitzmiller illustrates that the debate raging over intelligent design has
spread to the board rooms of public secondary schools and to the
communities that they serve. 2 As governmental bodies continue to debate
the issues raised by intelligent design, additional litigation appears
inevitable. Although Kitzmiller did not involve the actual teaching of

8. For accounts of the Kansas board's changes in direction, which ultimately led to
standards encouraging critiques of prevailing evolutionary theory, see Kenneth Chang,
Evolution and Its Discontents,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at F3; Nicholas Riccardi, Vote by
Kansas School BoardFavors Evolution'sDoubters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A14; Peter
Slevin, Kansas Education Board First to Back "Intelligent Design": Schools to Teach
Doubts About Evolutionary Theory, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al. After the most recent
change in the composition of the Kansas State Board of Education, the state's science
guidelines have been amended to omit any suggestion that important concepts of the theory
of evolution are controversial. See Josh Keller, State Digest: Another Revolution on
Evolutionfor Kansas Board, and Other News from the States, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb.
16, 2007, http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/02/2007021605n.htm.
9. See Lisa Anderson, Challengers of Evolution Lose: Ohio Board Votes to Remove
"Critical Analysis" in Science Curriculum, a Blow to Creationists, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15,
2006, at C3.
10. See Michael Powell, Judge Rules Against "IntelligentDesign": Dover, Pa., District
Can't Teach Evolution Alternative, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at AI.
11. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708-09, 765-66 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (finding a violation of the Establishment Clause when a school board required biology
teachers to read a statement that, in relevant part, (1) described "Darwin's Theory of
Evolution" as one that is subject to continuing tests and characterized by evidentiary gaps,
(2) informed students that "Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that
differs" from Darwinian evolution, and (3) referred students to a text that purportedly
teaches about intelligent design).
12. Cf Lisa Anderson, Darwin 's Theory Evolves into Culture War: Kansas Curriculum
Is Focal Point of Wider Struggle Across Nation, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2005, § 1, at 1
(reporting that in the first few months of 2005, "the issue of evolution has sparked at least 21
instances of controversy on the local and/or state level in at least 18 states").
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intelligent design,13 other cases surely will. 4 Consequently, a thoroughly

sophisticated analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the monkey
wrench of intelligent design is essential." The need for such an analysis is
13. Kitzmiller does not represent a true test case for teaching intelligent design in the
public school science classroom. Not only did the policy at issue not call for teaching
intelligent design, but also the book to which students were referred (for an explanation of
intelligent design) apparently does not even accurately articulate intelligent design theory.
Defense expert Michael Behe testified that he disagreed with the text's definition of
intelligent design. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.16. As indicated by the
discussion infra Part II.A.2, Professor Behe is one of the most prominent intelligent design
theorists. How Professor Behe understands intelligent design is much more probative of
what the theory really means than what a high school textbook says it means.
14. For example, a lawsuit challenging the teaching of intelligent design in California
public schools was filed on January 11, 2006. Complaint, Hurst v. Newman, No. 06-00012
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www2.ncseweb.org/hurst/Hurst_v_
NewmanComplaint.pdf; see also Henry Weinstein, 1st Suit in State to Attack "Intelligent
Design" Filed,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al. The parties settled the case six days after
the complaint was filed, however, and the California school dropped the class as a result of
the settlement. See Ann Simmons, In Lebec, "Intelligent Design" Class Is History, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at B 1.
15. The legal scholarship discussing the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design
in the public schools is growing. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon
of Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public
Schools, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 1507 (2002); Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious
Establishment,and the Challenge ofIntelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 461 (2003) [hereinafter Beckwith, Public Education]; Francis J. Beckwith, Science
and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v. Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the
New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455 (2003) [hereinafter
Beckwith, Science and Religion]; Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through
the Objective Observer's Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 417 (2006); Matthew J. Brauer, Barbara Forrest & Steven G. Gey, Is It Science
Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2005);
DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1; Kent Greenawalt, EstablishingReligious Ideas:
Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
321 (2003); H. Wayne House, Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific
Theories Survive Constitutional Challenge?, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 355 (2001); Casey
Luskin, Alternative Viewpoints About Biological Origins as Taught in Public Schools, 47 J.
CHURCH & ST. 583 (2005); Colin McRoberts & Timothy Sandefur, Piercing the Veil of
Intelligent Design: Why Courts Should Beware Creationism's Secular Disguise, 15 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15 (2005); Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment:
Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REv. 751 (2003);
Theresa Wilson, Evolution, Creation, and Naturally Selecting Intelligent Design out of the
Public Schools, 34 U. TOL. L. REv. 203 (2003); Wendy F. Hanakahi, Comment, EvolutionCreation Debate: Evaluating the Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in Public
School Classrooms, 25 U. HAW. L. REv. 9 (2002); Stephen L. Marshall, Note, When May a
State Require Teaching Alternatives to the Theory of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test
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all the more compelling because of significant deficiencies in the Kitzmiller
opinion. 6
The thesis of this Article is that teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom may be constitutionally permissible in some
cases, and that in some cases a decision to forbid the teaching of intelligent
design may be constitutionally impermissible. This thesis rests upon the
position, advanced and defended in this Article, that intelligent design is
properly viewed as neither an inherently religious conception of origins nor
an "alternative" to much evolutionary theory.
Insofar as some of the most important constitutional arguments
surrounding intelligent design require a keen appreciation for nuance, a
helpful starting point in advancing the thesis of this Article is to define the
terms taking center stage in the debate. Without a precise understanding of
the vocabulary that peppers the origins literature, the legal analyst has little
hope of reaching a truly informed constitutional resolution of the dispute.
Thus, Part ILA of this Article discusses the meaning(s) of evolution and
intelligent design.
Moreover, realism dictates that one analyze the constitutional issues
raised by intelligent design in the religious context in which the origins
controversy arose in our country and continues to swell-a land in which
the dominant religious faith is Christianity. To do so is not to imply any
disrespect or indifference to those who are not of the Christian faith (or of
the Jewish faith, which hallowed Genesis before Christianity ever existed).
Rather, acknowledging the religious context of the origins debate simply
facilitates an exploration of the real issues of constitutional concern. The
debate about the constitutionality of teaching intelligent design in the public
school science classroom is unlikely to advance meaningfully until both
skeptics and proponents of teaching intelligent design understand to what
degree the theory coincides with various Christian theological conceptions
of origins. In an effort to advance the debate, Part II.B explains the major
conceptions in Christian theology of how the physical world came to be.
Case, 90 KY. L.J. 743 (2002); T. Mark Mosely, Comment, Intelligent Design: A Unique
Perspectiveto the Origins Debate, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 327 (2003). While this literature
contributes importantly to an informed understanding of the constitutional issues, the
existing published analyses are far from exhaustive.
16. The most troublesome portions of Kitzmiller are not essential to its holding. Indeed,
as discussed below, the holding for the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller is not surprising. See infra
note 367. For a comprehensive, insightful critique of the judicial analysis of intelligent
design and evolutionary theory in Kitzmiller, see DAVID K. DEWOLF, JOHN G. WEST, CASEY
LUSKIN & JONATHAN WiTr, TRAIPSING INTO EVOLUTION: INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND THE
KITZMILLER VS. DOVER DECISION (2006).
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With this necessary background in place, Part III of this Article surveys
the Supreme Court precedent that guides the constitutional analysis of
intelligent design. Part III.A briefly discusses the tests that the Supreme
Court has employed in interpreting the Establishment Clause (and its
underlying norms), and Part III.B discusses the two Supreme Court cases
involving the teaching of evolution in public schools.
Next, Part IV thoroughly explores two controversial questions raised by
the prospect of teaching intelligent design in the public school science
classroom. The first question, discussed in Part IV.A, is whether intelligent
design is necessarily a "religion" within the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, or whether it inherently consists of "religious" ideas. Part IV.B
considers the second question-whether the discipline of science must
refrain from referring to supernatural causation. Although this question is
plainly philosophical, it is also constitutionally relevant. 7
Finally, Part V sketches the analysis necessary to answer two crucial
constitutional questions raised by the foregoing discussion. Part V.A
discusses under what circumstances the Establishment Clause permits a
governmental body to authorize (or perhaps even require) the teaching of
intelligent design in the public school science classroom. Next, Part V.B
explores under what circumstances a governmental body's decision to
prohibitthe teaching of intelligent design may be unconstitutional.
II. SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINS

A. Two Scientific"s Conceptions of Origins: Evolution andIntelligent
Design
The issues underlying the origins debate have been obfuscated (perhaps,
in some cases, intentionally) by the use of "evolution" without clarification
as to its precise meaning in any given context. Similarly, "intelligent

17. See infra Part V.
18. That this part of the article surveys two "scientific" conceptions of origins does not
imply that the "scientific" nature of each theory is undisputed. Indeed, the question of
whether intelligent design is inherently unscientific because of its supernatural implications
is discussed infra Part IV.B. The discussion in this part of the article therefore should be
understood to describe two views of origins that purport to be scientific. Moreover, by
devoting this part of the article to "scientific" theories of origins and Part II.B to
"theological" concepts of origins, I am not assuming that scientific theory and theology
never overlap. Rather, by designating the concepts in Part II.B as "theological," I mean only
that they articulate a theory of origins that addresses the involvement (or noninvolvement) of
God, explicitly or by implication, upon some basis that is not limited to evidence observable
from nature.
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design" has been used without an appreciation for what it does, and does
not, convey. This section provides some much-needed clarity.
1. The Meaning of Evolution
Yale biology professor Keith Thomson has discussed three common
meanings of evolution: (1) change over time; (2) the relationships of
organisms by descent through common ancestry; and (3) an explanatory
mechanism for the pattern and process of the foregoing meanings of
evolution (such as natural selection). 9
The first meaning of evolution, change over time, is not necessarily
controversial. Nature has a history,20 and that history (or portions of it) can
often be discerned through observation. For example, paleontologists study
changes of animals in the fossil record, and astronomers study the life cycle
of stars.2' The third meaning of evolution--evolution as a mechanism for
producing morphological change-also enjoys widespread support,
although prominent scientists (including those who reject intelligent
design) 22 dispute the degree to which natural selection acting on random
genetic variations and mutations can produce significant variations within a
population.2 3
The second meaning of evolution identified by Professor Thomson
requires refinement.24 "Descent through common ancestry" can mean two
types of evolution. The first is "limited common descent," the notion that
particular groups of organisms (species or perhaps even higher
classifications, such as genera or families) have descended from a common

19. See Keith Stewart Thomson, Marginalia: The Meanings of Evolution, 70 AM.
SCIENTIST 529 (1982).
20. See Stephen C. Meyer & Michael Newton Keas, The Meanings of Evolution, in
DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 135, 137.
21. See id.
22. According to the late Harvard University Professor Stephen Jay Gould, who was not
an intelligent design supporter, the neo-Darwinian synthesis "is effectively dead, despite its
persistence as textbook orthodoxy." Stephen Jay Gould, Is a New and General Theory of
Evolution Emerging?, 6 PALEOBIOLOGY 119, 119-20 (1980).
The "neo-Darwinian
synthesis" joins Darwin's theory of natural selection with post-Mendellian genetics. See
Christopher Michael Langan, Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of
Scientific Naturalism, in UNCOMMON DISSENT: INTELLECTUALS WHO FIND DARWINISM
UNCONVINCING 233,235 (William A. Dembski ed., 2004).
23. Gould, supra note 22, at 128-29.
24. One can probably speak of an even greater number of meanings of evolution. See,
e.g., Meyer & Keas, supranote 20, at 136-37 (listing six meanings of evolution discussed in
biology texts).
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ancestor. The Galapagos Island finches made famous by Charles Darwin
illustrate probable common descent from a single South American finch
species, 2' and recognition of this common descent is widespread.
More controversial is the second type of descent through common
ancestry-"universal common descent"--which holds that all living
organisms have descended from a common ancestor or an extremely small
number of ancestors.27 Universal common descent is one important feature
of Darwinian evolution.28
Darwin's view has been described as
"monophyletic" because it claims that all organisms ultimately form one
large family.29
The view postulates almost "unbounded biological
change."3 Several modem biologists-including those not associated with
the intelligent design movement-reject Darwin's monophyletic view of
life. They prefer a polyphyletic view of life's history, which understands
the present diversity of organisms to have arisen from separate ancestral
lines. 1
Adherents of this view cite evidence from paleontology,
embryology, biochemistry, and molecular biology.32 Although one can
embrace evolution as a mechanism for change (the third major sense of
evolution identified above) and be either a monophyletic or a polyphyletic
evolutionist, it appears that polyphyletic evolutionists generally believe that
natural selection as a mechanism for change has a more limited role than do
their more purely Darwinian counterparts.3 3
To these biological meanings of evolution must be added the "general
theory of evolution."34 Under this theory, "all the living forms in the world
have arisen from a single source which itself came from an inorganic

25.
26.
27.
28.

See id.
at 136-38.
See id. at 137-38.
See id.at 136, 138.
See, e.g., CHARLES

DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL

SELECTION 483-84, 488-89 (London, Murray 1859), available at http://www.esp.orgfbooks/

darwinorigin/facsimile/title3.html (follow "Table of Contents" hyperlink; then follow "XIV.
Recapitulation and Conclusion" hyperlink).
29. See Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 138. Strictly speaking, Darwin did not insist
that all life evolved from only one living organism; he allowed for five progenitors in each
of the animal and plant kingdoms. See DARwIN, supra note 28, at 484.
30. Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 139.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See G.A. KERKUT, IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTION 157 (1960).
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form."35 Thus, one may speak of the origins debate as addressing both the
"origin of life" and the "origin of species. 36
Finally, there are at least three other meanings of evolution worthy of
identification-evolutionary creationism, deistic evolution and atheistic
evolution. These versions of evolutionary theory combine one or more of
the above senses of evolution with a theory of the involvement (or absence
of the involvement) of God. Although, as argued below, tidy and
supposedly impermeable distinctions between "theological" and "scientific"
conceptions of origins break down in some instances," this article will
discuss these final types of evolutionary theory with other theological
conceptions of origins.
2.

The Meaning of Intelligent Design

Professors William Dembski and Michael Ruse, an advocate and
opponent of intelligent design, respectively, define and summarize
intelligent design as follows:
[It is] the hypothesis that in order to explain life it is necessary to
suppose the action of an unevolved intelligence. One simply cannot explain organisms, those living and those long gone, by
reference to normal natural causes or material mechanisms, be
these straightforwardly evolutionary or a consequence of
evolution .... [I]t is not necessarily the case that a commitment to
Intelligent Design implies a commitment to a personal God or
indeed to any God that would be acceptable to the world's major
religions. The claim is simply that there must be something more
than ordinary natural causes or material mechanisms, and
moreover, that something must be intelligent and capable of
bringing about organisms.3"
Like Darwinism, intelligent design scholars study the apparent design of
the natural world. Unlike Darwinism, advocates of intelligent design
"claim[] that the best explanation for at least some of the appearance of
design in nature is that this design is actual. 39 Intelligent design maintains
35. Id.
36. Some may prefer to separate these inquiries entirely. However, insofar as intelligent
design advocates have argued that intelligent design is necessary to explain both life's
origins and its development, this article will frequently refer simply to the "origins debate."
37. See infraPart V.B.
38. William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse, General Introduction to DEBATING DESIGN,
supra note 1, at 3, 3.
39. Angus Menuge, Who's Afraid of ID?, in DEBATING DESIGN, supra note 1, at 32, 32.
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that intelligent causes can and do leave "empirically detectable marks in the
natural world."4'
Specifically, some forms of complex information
appearing in the natural world suggest the activity of intelligent agency.'
More precisely, intelligent design theorists have argued, first, that certain
biological systems, such as the immune system, are irreducibly complex.4 2
Because all of the components of the system must be present in order for it
to function, the incremental changes contemplated by the Darwinian
mechanism are extremely unlikely to produce the final product;
"transitional" versions of the system would be non-functional, and therefore
should not survive the evolutionary process.43 More generally, intelligent
design theorists have argued that many cases of complex specified
information in nature, of which irreducible complexity is but one example,'
point to intelligent design.45 The basic idea, an application of probability
and statistical theory, is that intelligent agency can be detected when an
improbable (i.e., complex) outcome conforms to a pattern (i.e.,
specification).46

40. Id.
41. William A. Dembski, Introduction: Mere Creation, in MERE CREATION, supra note
1, at 13, 17 ("Intelligent design properly formulated is a theory of information."); Menuge,
supra note 39, at 32.
42. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARwIN'S BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE
TO EVOLUTION 117-39 (1996).
43. For a concise explanation of Dr. Behe's argument relying upon irreducible

complexity, see Michael J. Behe, Design in the Details: The Origin of Biomolecular
Machines, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 287. For
critiques of Dr. Behe's arguments, see, for example, David Depew, Intelligent Design and
Irreducible Complexity: A Rejoinder,in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra
note 1, at 441; and BRUCE H. WEBER, Biochemical Complexity: Emergence or Design?, in
DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 455.

44. See Menuge, supranote 39, at 47.
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, No FREE LUNCH: WHY SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY
CANNOT BE PURCHASED WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE (2002); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN
INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998).
46. For a relatively concise explanation of specified complexity, see William A.
Dembski, Reinstating Design Within Science, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 403 [hereinafter Dembski, ReinstatingDesign]; and William A.

Dembski, The Logical Underpinningsof Intelligent Design, in DEBATING DESIGN, supra note
1, at 311.

For a critique of Dr. Dembski's arguments, see, for example, Branden Fitelson,

Christopher Stephens & Elliott Sober, How Not to Detect Design-CriticalNotice: William
A. Dembski, the Design Inference, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS,
supra note 1, at 597; and Peter Godfrey-Smith, Information and the Argument from Design,
in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 1, at 575.
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Intelligent design is in many respects both modest (i.e., of limited
ambition)4 7 and diverse (with respect to the views of its proponents). It
confines itself to the basic question of whether material forces alone can
account for the origin and development of life; it does not engage in
tangential speculations. For example, intelligent design theory does not
attempt to discover the nature of the intelligent agent of design.4" Thus, the
question of whether the designer is anything like the God revealed in any
religious text is neither explored nor assumed.4 9 Moreover, advocates of
intelligent design are not uniform in their estimation of the positive
explanatory power of evolution. Some supporters of intelligent design
believe that the designing agent "works in tandem with a limited form of
evolution, perhaps even Darwinian evolution," whereas others deny
evolution any role except, perhaps, in "lower taxonomic levels."5 Indeed,
one leading intelligent design theorist, biochemistry professor Michael
Behe, considers the theory of common descent "fairly convincing," and has
"no particular reason to doubt it."5 Behe also acknowledges that natural
selection "might explain many things."5 2
3. The Relationship Between Evolution and Intelligent Design
The foregoing discussion should make clear that scientific conceptions
of evolution and scientific conceptions of intelligent design are not entirely
incompatible. Evolutionary theory does not necessarily refute the presence
of an intelligent agent.
Moreover, notwithstanding Judge Jones's
misleading suggestion to the contrary in Kitzmiller,53 intelligent design
47. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 17 ("Intelligent design is theologically minimalist.
It detects intelligence without speculating about the nature of the intelligence.").
48. See Dembski & Ruse, supra note 38, at 3.
49. Although many advocates of intelligent design are Christian, see id., some are not.
Indeed, at least one prominent scientist associated with intelligent design (Michael Denton)
is agnostic. See Menuge, supra note 39, at 35. Those theists associated with the movement
are a diverse group, including the faithful of Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Eastern
Orthodoxy, and the Unification Church (the followers of the Reverend Moon). See House,
supra note 15, at 402-03.
50. See Dembski & Ruse, supra note 38, at 3.
51.

See BEHE, supra note 42, at 5.

52. Id.
53. According to the opinion, intelligent design "posits that animals did not evolve
naturally through evolutionary means but were created abruptly by a normatural, or
supernatural, designer." Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736
(M.D. Pa. 2005). In support of his finding, Judge Jones cites the testimony of intelligent
design theorist Michael Behe that it is "implausible that the designer is a natural entity." Id.
That the court cites Behe for the assertion that "animals did not evolve naturally" is terribly
ironic, given that Behe has publicly embraced much evolutionary theory. Professor Behe's
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theory does not require a rejection of any, let alone all, of the various
meanings of evolution.54 What distinguishes intelligent design from
evolutionary theory is the former's insistence that the origin and
development of life cannot be explained exclusively by natural causes.
Granted, some theorists who embrace intelligent design also minimize the
role of natural selection in the development of species. 5 But to accept
intelligent design is not to reject the whole, or (necessarily) even much, of
evolutionary theory.56 Rather, intelligent design essentially challenges the
sufficiency of evolutionary theory to account entirely for the development
(and origin) of life.
B. Theological Conceptions 7 of Origins
Many religions purport to explain the origins of the universe, including
biological life.
Creation stories appear not only in Genesis--a
foundational canonical text in Judaism and Christianity-but also in sacred
texts, hymns, and oral traditions of Islam,59 Hinduism, ° Taoism, 61 Native
American religions, 62 and Native African religions,63 among others. One or
more gods figure prominently in numerous creation stories.'

whole argument is not that evolution served no significant role in the development of life,
but that it did not serve as the exclusive role in such development. See BEHE, supra note 42.
54. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 19 ("Intelligent design is logically compatible with
everything from utterly discontinuous creation ... to the most far-ranging evolution (e.g.,
God seamlessly melding all organisms together into one great tree of life).").
55. See, e.g., Stephen C. Meyer, Marcus Ross, Paul Nelson & Paul Chien, The
Cambrian Explosion: Biology's Big Bang, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION,
supra note 1, at 323, 337-54 (arguing that evolutionary theories of macroevolution fail to
account for the appearance of phyla in the Cambrian fossil record).
56. See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN 252 (1999) (stating that intelligent
design can accommodate evolutionary change to any extent).
57. A "theological" conception of origins within the meaning of this article is one that
speaks to the involvement (or noninvolvement) of God, explicitly or by implication, upon
some basis that is not limited to evidence observable from nature. Views associated with
religions that posit God's involvement (or the absence of the involvement of God or any
god) are theological under this definition.
58. Genesis 1:1-2:25.
59. AL-QUR'AN 41:9-21 (Ahmed Ali trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
60. See BARBARA C. SPROUL, PRIMAL MYTHS: CREATION MYTHS AROUND THE WORLD
179-92 (1979).
61. See id. at 199-205.
62. See id. at 232-86.
63. See id. at 31-76.
64. See generally SPROUL, supra note 60 (discussing creation myths around the world).
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In the United States, of course, the oft-perceived tension between
theological and scientific explanations for the origin of life is historically
rooted in certain interpretations of the book of Genesis. Indeed, many who
support teaching evolutionary theory in public schools without qualification
appear to attribute all or most of the skepticism toward such teaching to the
"Christian fundamentalist" interpretation of Genesis, whatever that phrase
means.65 Unfortunately, those who are among the most informed about the
body of constitutional law bearing upon the origins debate are not
necessarily equally informed about the precise theological views at issue.
The proper resolution of the constitutional issues raised by intelligent
design is unlikely to occur without a more illuminated comprehension of
the major theological conceptions of life's origins and development.
This section sketches the theological framework for understanding the
origins debate. First, this part discusses Biblically based theological
conceptions of origins in an attempt to summarize the exegetical debate
concerning two difficulties encountered by interpreters of the Bible, and to
65. See, e.g., Jeanne Anderson, The Revolution Against Evolution, or "Well, Darwin,
We're Not in Kansas Anymore," 29 J.L. & EDUC. 398, 403 (2000) (arguing that, "since
evolution and the big bang theory are particularly opposed by fundamentalist Christians," a
state's decision not to test students on such subjects confers direct benefits on a certain sect);
Stephanie L. Shemin, The Potential ConstitutionalityofIntelligentDesign?, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 621, 664 (2005) ("[E]ver since Darwin proposed his theory of natural selection,
there has been a rift between scientific research and religious doctrine, notably among
biologists who accept the theory of evolution and Christian fundamentalists who do not.");
Randall W. Hall, Note, UnnaturalSelection: The FundamentalistCrusadeAgainst Evolution
and the New Strategies to DiscreditDarwin, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUn. POL'Y 165, 168 (2006)
(stating that "the opposition to the theory of evolution emerges from the small sector of
fundamentalist Christians in America who argue that the Biblical account of creation found
in the book of Genesis is the only correct origin story"); id. at 179 ("Fundamentalists have
also sought to stifle the teaching of evolution by arguing that belief in evolution constitutes
religion."); id. at 186 ("Fundamentalists now cloak their disgust for evolution in theories
"); Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of
such as Intelligent Design ..
History: The Evolution of Creationism and Current Trends to Restrict the Teaching of
Evolution in Public Schools, 49 DRAKE L. Rrv. 125, 142 (2000) (characterizing evolution as
"the very theory that directly conflicts with the Biblical version of creation and that has
historically been opposed by Christian fundamentalists").
In fact, it is not clear that a distinctly Christian "fundamentalist" interpretation of
Genesis exists. Fundamentalists are often charged with embracing a "literal" interpretation
of Genesis. Several distinct interpretations of Genesis, however, may fairly be characterized
as "literal," and they have very different implications when harmonizing science and
Scripture. Moreover, the term "fundamentalist" is terribly misused in discussing the origins
controversy. Cf STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 169 (1993) (referring to

the "certainly misleading use of the term 'fundamentalist"' in the controversy surrounding
creationism and science instruction in the public schools).
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discuss how these debates relate to broader conceptions of origins in
Christian theology. Next, this part examines two theological positions on
origins that are not grounded in Biblical theology. This discussion of the
myriad theological positions on origins informs the legal questions raised
by teaching intelligent design in the public schools.
1. Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of Origins
a.

Interpretations of the Biblical Text

As most legal scholars addressing the origins debate are aware, Genesis
states that God created the heavens and the earth.66 Also of common
knowledge to many is Genesis's account that God created light, the sky,
land, oceans, the stars (including the sun), the moon, plant and animal life,
and human beings.67 Finally, God is said to have completed His creation in
six "days."68 These statements may well exhaust many legal analysts'
depth of knowledge of the Biblical creation texts. The precise meaning of
the first two chapters of Genesis, however, has eluded scholars for
centuries.
Of course, the text is clear that God is the creator.69 But specifying the
time and manner of the creation of the universe is a much more difficult
matter. There are two particularly difficult interpretive questions.
The first question concerns the meaning of the first three verses of
Genesis 1:
[1] In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. [2]
And the earth was formless and void, and darkness was over the
surface of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moving over the
surface of the waters. [3] Then God said, "Let there be light"; and
there was light.7"
There are several major interpretations of these verses, all of which
attempt to explain the relationship between the clauses in verse 2 and the

66. See Genesis 1:1, 3-10.
67. See id.1:1-27, 2:7-25.
68. See id.1:5,8, 13, 19, 23, 31.
69. In the Old Testament, the Creator-God is identified as Yahweh. See, e.g., id.2:4.
The New Testament identifies the pre-incarnate Christ (God the Son) as the one through
whom God made the universe. See John 1:1-3, 10, 15; Colossians 1:13-17; Hebrews 1:1-3.
70. Genesis 1:1-3 (New American Standard Bible).
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entirety of verse 1.71 Although numerous variations of these interpretations
exist, four major views can be identified.
Under one view, verse 1 refers to the first part of the first day of creation
discussed in Genesis 1:3-5.72 According to this view, the "creation" of
verse 1 is ex nihilo.7 3 This view also reads the clauses of Genesis 1:2 to
refer to the state of the earth immediately following the creation of the
universe ax nihilo but before the creative acts recorded in the remainder of
Genesis 1.74
A second major view also takes the creation of verse 1 to be ex nihilo.7"
This view, however, holds that the creation of verse 1 refers to an original,
perfect creation distinct from the creation account beginning with verse 3
(i.e., a creation distinct from the universe as we now know it). Under this
view, the state of the earth in verse 2-formless and void--describes a
condition resulting from the fall of Satan,76 which brought God's judgment
of chaos upon the earth." Verse 3 thus describes the first step of God's
reconstruction, or recreation, of the earth that had been judged.78
A third view moderates between the first two interpretations. Under this
reading of Genesis 1, the first verse of the chapter indeed refers to creation
ex nihilo, but with a vast gap of time between either the first two verses or
the second and third verses.79 Unlike the second view, verse 2 is not read to
suggest judgment. The six creative days are thought to begin with either
verse 2 or verse 3.80
71. For a scholarly discussion of these views, including a brief analysis of the most
important Hebrew terms in the text, see ALLEN P. Ross, CREATION AND BLESSING: A GUIDE
TO THE STUDY AND ExpOsiTIoN OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS 103-08, 718-23 (1988).
72. See, e.g., 1 H.C. LEUPOLD, ExPOSinON OF GENESIS 39-42 (1942).
73. Creation ex nihilo is creation "from nothing."
74. See Ross, supra note 71, at 718. In other words, this view understands Genesis I to
describe a single creation from beginning to end.
75. According to Ross, supra note 71, at 718-19, the first edition of the Scofield
Reference Bible advances this view. See generally THE SCOFIELD REFERENCE BIBLE (Cyrus
Ingerson Scofield ed., 1909). The view was first popularized by Thomas Chalmers of
Scotland in 1814 and has been embraced by several others. See CHARLES C. RYRIE, BASIC
THEOLOGY 209 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Isaiah 45; Jeremiah 4:23-26; Ezekiel 28.

77. Strong exegetical arguments support the view that the earth's condition of being
"formless and void" is a result of divine judgment. See Ross, supranote 71, at 106-07, 722.
78. See id. at 719. For a critique of this "reconstruction" (also known as "gap" or
"restitution") theory, see Mark F. Rooker, Genesis 1:1-3: Creation or Re-Creation?:Part 1,
149 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 316, 317-18 (1992).
79. See Gary G. Cohen, HermeneuticalPrinciples and Creation Theories, 5 GRACE J.
17,25 (1964).
80. See id.
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A fourth view (of which several variations exist) holds that Genesis 1:1
does not refer to creation ex nihilo.8" One significant variation of this view,
which partially builds upon the exposition of Genesis by the German
scholar Gerhard von Rad,82 understands Genesis 1:1 to summarize the
detailed account of creation in the remainder of Genesis 1. Genesis 1:2
records the state of the earth immediately before God spoke the recreated
universe-the universe as we know it-into existence. This state of the
earth, as under the second view discussed above, resulted from God's
judgment following the fall of Satan. Unlike the second view, however,
this view places Satan's fall not between verses 1 and 2, but sometime prior
to the creation account of Genesis 1.83 Although this view accepts an initial
creation of a universe by God,84 it does not find any explicit record of it in
Genesis 1. Genesis 1 simply describes God's reshaping of the judged
(initial) universe into what we now know as our universe.85
The second major interpretive question that has proved extremely
significant is the meaning of "day," and the periods of time marked by each
"day," as the term is used throughout Genesis 1. Several views exist.86
One view holds that each day is a twenty-four hour period, uninterrupted by
additional periods of time. Thus, this view maintains that the creation
described in Genesis 1:3-31 occurred over six solar days as we currently
experience them.87 A second view, known as the "day-age" view, posits
that each day represents a long period of time, even a geological age.88 A
third theory, sometimes identified as the "intermittent-day" view, is that
each day of Genesis refers to a solar day, but long periods of time elapsed
between successive "days."89 A fourth position, known as the "revelatory81. See Ross, supra note 71, at 719-20.
82. GERHARD VON RAD, GENESIS: A COMMENTARY 49-51 (John H. Marks trans., 1972).
83. See Ross, supra note 71, at 720-23.
84. Texts other than Genesis support God's creation ex nihilo. See, e.g., John 1:3;
Hebrews 11:3.
85. For a critique of this view, see Mark F. Rooker, Genesis 1:1-3: Creation or ReCreation?:Part2, 149 BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 411 (1992).
86. For a discussion of four of these views, see RYRIE, supra note 75, at 211-13. For a
discussion of theologians who have embraced each view, see Cohen, supra note 79, at 2527.
87. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 71, at 109.
88. See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLE DIFFICULTIES 58-63 (1982).
The Hebrew term that is translated "day" in English is transliterated "yom." Yom can refer
to an extended period of time. See ROSS, supra note 71, at 108-09 (discussing, but not
adopting, this meaning of yom).
89. This view is described, but not endorsed, by Charles Ryrie. See RYIE, supra note
75, at 211.
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day" view, holds that each day refers not to the time during which God
created the universe and life forms, but to the time during which God
revealed His creative work to Moses (the author of the Pentateuch). 90
The foregoing attempts to answer these two interpretive questions are
consistent with what may be characterized as "literal" hermeneutics 9' (or,
perhaps more accurately, "literary-historical," or "literary-grammaticalhistorical" hermeneutics).92 A nonliteral interpretation of Genesis 1
requires a much less rigorous analysis of the terms and grammar of Genesis
1. A common nonliteral interpretation of Genesis 1 is that it is merely a
creation myth or an allegory, intended not to be historically accurate, but
instead to communicate religious truth.93
The purpose of summarizing these various interpretations of Genesis is
not to evaluate their merits; thus, this Article will refrain from analyzing the
exegetical strengths and weaknesses of each position. Rather, the purpose
of surveying these competing views is to lay the groundwork for
understanding the textual bases underlying the various theological
conceptions of the nature of God's creative activity. This Article now turns
to these various theological schools of thought.
b.

Theological Conceptions of the Nature of God's Creative Work
in Genesis

One theological position on the Genesis creation account is often called
"theistic evolution," 94 although the term "evolutionary creationism" more

90. See, e.g., BERNARD RAMM, THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF SCIENCE AND SCRIPTURE 226-29
(1954). Some also describe a similar notion, the "framework hypothesis," which argues that
the days embody a literary device, rather than a chronology. See Robert C. Newman,
Progressive Creationism, in THREE VIEws ON CREATION AND EvOLUTION 103, 105 (J.P.
Moreland & John Mark Reynolds eds., 1999) (describing, but not adopting, the framework
hypothesis).
91. Simply stated, hermeneutics is "the science (principles) and art (task) by which the

meaning of the biblical text is determined." RoY B. ZuCK, BASIC

BIBLE INTERPRETATION

19

(1991). Hermeneutics is prior to exegesis, the determination of the meaning of a text. See
id. at 19-22.
92. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 24-27. The literary-historical method seeks to
understand both the language and the culture of the world in which the Biblical author lived.

See D.P. Fuller, History of Interpretation, in 2

THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BIBLE

863, 864 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley et al. eds., 1982). For a defense of the
literary-historical method, see id. at 872-74.
93. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 27 (criticizing the mythological view).
94. Dr. Ryrie is characteristic in describing the view discussed in the text accompanying
this note as theistic evolution. See RYRLE, supra note 75, at 196-97. He obviously does not
subscribe to this view. See id. For critiques of evolutionary creationism, see, for example,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
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accurately captures the essence of the view.95 Evolutionary creationism
embraces the scientific consensus that complex organisms evolved from
simple life forms through mutations and natural selection.96 Further,
evolutionary creationism posits that God extensively used, and even
directed, the process of naturalistic evolution in creating. 97 As one
thoughtful evolutionary creationist explains, this view embraces a "concept
of a creation that has been equipped by God with all of the capabilities that
are necessary to make possible the evolutionary development now
98
envisioned by the natural sciences.,
Evolutionary creationism holds to the Biblical view of God as the creator
and sustainer of the universe. 99 It simply interprets the Genesis account to
set forth what may be described as a purely providential-as opposed to a
miraculous or interventionist-picture of how God created the heavens and
the earth."
Evolutionary creationists may embrace the day-age view of
Genesis 1,1 or view the passage as a creation myth.0 2 Further, under their
view, the creation is a product of God's design (as indicated in Genesis 1),
but the evolutionary development of the creation did not require that God
act through means other than the natural processes that He conceived.' 3
Evolutionary creationism accepts the Biblical view that God interacts with
David H. Lane, Theological Problemswith Theistic Evolution, 151

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

155

(1994).

95. Cf.Howard J. Van Till, The Fully Gifted Creation, in

THREE VIEWS ON CREATION

EVOLUTION, supranote 90, at 159, 161, 172 (stating that he has occasionally styled his
view as "evolving creation"). From the perspective of a theologian who embraces both the
Biblical doctrine that God is the creator who brought everything else into being and the
scientific evidence for the evolution of life on earth from simplistic life forms to complex
organisms, the term "theistic evolution" improperly emphasizes the process--evolutionrather than the One who conceived, oversaw, and implemented the process-God. See id
Because an adherent of these two positions accepts God's role in creation as primary in two
senses-chronologically and diachronically-I believe the position should be styled so as to
convey that it is a form of creationism.
96. See J.P. Moreland & John Mark Reynolds, Introduction to THREE VIEWS ON
CREATION AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 7, 24-25.
97. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196-97.
98. Van Till, supra note 95, at 173.
99. See, e.g., id. at 170-71.
100. Cf id at 185-92 (rejecting the view that God miraculously "intervened" at various
stages of creation in favor of the view that God conceptualized and magnificently "gifted"
the universe with the capacity to evolve into its current state).
101. See RYRUE, supra note 75, at 196.
102. See David H. Lane, Special Creation or Evolution. No Middle Ground, 151
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA 11, 14 (1994).
103. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 196.
AND
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His creation; it simply posits that, after God conceived of and "gifted" His
creation with the capacity to develop, His additional acts upon His creation
occurred through those natural processes that He initially created, rather
than through extrinsic processes."

Whereas evolutionary creationism may rightly be described as fully
compatible with all current scientific data, the Biblically based theological
conception of origins that is in the greatest tension with current scientific
data (or, at least, with broadly held interpretations of such data) is "youngearth" (or "recent") creationism. Young-earth creationism holds that God
directly created all life on earth (and even the entire cosmos) during the
creation week of Genesis 1 and 2.05 The days are typically taken to be
solar days.0 6 Coupled with the genealogies set forth in Genesis, this view
deduces that the universe is of much more recent origin than what is widely
believed today.0 7 Young-earth creationists believe that the flood of Noah
was not only historical, but also global. 8 The global flood is hypothesized
to have produced the fossil record.01 9 Young-earth creationists also believe
that "[t]he curse of Genesis 3:14-19 profoundly affected every aspect of the
natural economy."" 0° Thus, all natural evil-including the death of
animals-is attributable to the sin of man in the Garden of Eden. Major
institutional advocates of the young-earth position include the Creation
Research Society, the Geoscience Research Institute, and the Institute for
Creation Research."'
If evolutionary creationism is at one end of the spectrum of compatibility
with the current interpretation of scientific data by most scientists, and
young-earth creationism is at the other end, somewhere between the two is
"progressive" (or "old earth") creationism. Progressive creationism also
holds that God directly created the cosmos and life on earth, but that the
earth, and indeed the entire universe, are old (even billions of years old).12
Progressive creationists typically believe that God used "some combination
of supernatural intervention and providential guidance" to create the
104. See Van Till, supra note 95, at 243-44.
105. See, e.g., Paul Nelson & John Mark Reynolds, Young Earth Creationism,in THREE
VIEWS ON CREATION AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 39,42, 51-53.
106. See, e.g., id.at 44 (distinguishing recent and progressive creationists on the basis
that the latter "tend to view the days of creation as long periods of time").
107. See, e.g., id. at 49-50, 73.
108. See, e.g., id at 42.
109. See RYRIE, supra note 75, at 214.
110. See Nelson & Reynolds, supra note 105, at 42.
111. See id. at 42-43.
112. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 90, at 105.
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universe.' 13 They posit that God created all else that exists progressively,
over long periods of time." 4 At least some progressive creationists appear
willing to recognize the presence of some transitional species in the fossil
record." 5 Although there are variations of progressive creationism, they all
appear to adopt one of the various interpretations of "days" in Genesis that
do not result in a creation week of six solar days for the entire universe." 6
Some of these views produce a rather striking correlation between the
Genesis creation account and the broad understandings of Earth's origins
proposed by modem geology and astronomy."'
Creationists who argue for (1) an original creation (either described in
Genesis 1:1 or elsewhere in Scripture) distinct from the universe as we now
know it, and (2) a creation week of six solar days for the universe (as we
now know it), are not, strictly speaking, progressive creationists." 8 They
may appropriately be called "reconstructive creationists."
Unlike
progressive creationists, reconstructive creationists do not interpret the bulk
of Genesis 1 to advance a chronology of eras coinciding with the geological
timetable." 9 This observation does not mean, however, that reconstructive
creationists necessarily reject modem methods of dating the universe.
Their view of an original creation, later judged by God, is consistent with a
very old earth, even one created over billions of years ago. Further, their
view of an original creation much older than the "re-created" or "restored"
planet allows 2for much modem interpretation of the data produced by the
fossil record.

c.

1

Summary: The Relationship Between Intelligent Design,
Evolution, and Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of
Origins

The foregoing discussion compels the conclusion that Biblically based
theological conceptions of origins are best conceptualized along a spectrum,
rather than in distinct compartments. The spectrum represents the degree to
which God is thought to be directly involved in the creative process (i.e.,
113. See, e.g., id. at 105-06.
114. See, e.g., id. at 106.
115. See, e.g., John Jefferson Davis, Response to Robert C. Newman, in THREE VIEws ON
CREATION AND EVOLUTION, supra note 90, at 137, 137-40.
116. See Newman, supranote 90, at 107.
117. See, e.g., id at 107-08.
118. See id. at 106.
119. See id. (describing the restoration of the earth as having occurred in "six literal
days").
120. See RYiE, supra note 75, at 208-09.
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the degree to which God acts miraculously or by other forms of
intervention, rather than providentially through nature). The degree of
correspondence between a theological conception of origins and scientific
conceptions of origins depends upon where the former falls along the
spectrum.
At one end of the spectrum is young-earth creationism. Because of its
very short creative period, and its view of a recent earth, young-earth
creationism must be considered largely inconsistent with evolutionary
theory; it certainly seems to leave no room for significant macroevolutionary development of life. Although young-earth creationism is
consistent with the existence of an intelligent agent, it goes far beyond the
views of intelligent design theorists (several of whom hold views
inconsistent with young-earth creationism).
At the other end of the spectrum is evolutionary creationism.
Evolutionary creationism accommodates widespread evolutionary
development, and in its pure form (theoretically, at least) could even
tolerate the origin of life through natural means. Evolutionary creationism
could also embrace the "designer" of intelligent design, but it posits a
different role for the designer than that contemplated by intelligent design
theory.'2 1 To the evolutionary creationist, God acts exclusively (or almost
exclusively) through processes that are plausibly explainable solely in
natural terms, rather than through events of design (throughout the course
of nature's history) that are necessary to effect an outcome that nature
would not have taken without some intelligent direction, 2 Moreover, and
counterintuitively, for many evolutionary creationists, God could be much
more active than the designer of intelligent design.2 3 Evolutionary
creationism is consistent with the view that God is constantly and
purposefully acting through the natural world that He has created;
intelligent design requires no such constancy in the role of the designer.'24
Progressive
creationism and reconstructive
creationism
can
accommodate a great deal of evolutionary development, as well as the
121. See Del Ratzsch, Design, Chance & Theistic Evolution, in MERE CREATION, supra
note 1, at 289, 300 (explaining that theistic evolution "can readily incorporate design that
tracks back (continuously) to primordial conditions or to the ultimate structuring of natural
laws and principles").
122. See id. ("Thus where design theory potentially differs from theistic evolution will be
precisely in the potential for explanatory appeals to design of a sort that requires intervention
into cosmic history.").
123. See id. at 310 n.4 ("Many theistic evolutionists claim that God upholds all things at
every instance and that laws describe his usual ways of dealing with the cosmos.").
124. Neither does intelligent design refute such a role for the designer, of course.
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direct activity of an intelligent agent. Progressive creationists typically
believe that God created the universe and life in part through supernatural
acts, which is consistent with intelligent design. Some progressive
creationists also accept the probability of substantial evolutionary
Similarly, there is nothing inherent in
development of organisms.
reconstructive creationism that requires a rejection of significant
evolutionary development. In theory, the "original" creation contemplated
by reconstructive creationists could have witnessed considerable evolution.
Finally, neither evolution nor intelligent design requires the adoption of
any "creationist" view described herein. Evolutionary theory does not
speak to God's role in creation. Further, three of the creationist views
described herein clearly do not require a rejection of evolutionary theory (at
least not most of it). Only young-earth creationism appears incompatible
with significant evolutionary development of organisms. Neither does
intelligent design necessarily correspond to any Biblical account of
creation. Intelligent design deduces intelligent agency, but not one that
must fit a Christian conception of a creator. Indeed, the agent of design
need not (though it could) work outside of natural laws (i.e.,
miraculously)." 5
2. Non-Biblically Based Theological Conceptions of Origins
Two important theological views of origins that are not compatible with
any plausible interpretation of the Biblical account of creation are deistic
evolution and atheistic evolution. Deistic evolution posits the existence of
God, but has little else in common with any form of creationism. Deistic
evolution understands God to have created the universe so that natural
processes occurring subsequent to the original creation exclusively have
caused the extensive development of all life forms, unaided (or
substantially unaided) through time by further divine activity. 6 It appears
at least
that Charles Darwin was theologically at most a deistic evolutionist,
27
when he wrote the first edition of On the Origin of Species
125. See Dembski, supra note 41, at 17 ("[I]ntelligent design presupposes neither a
creator nor miracles."). For an explanation of why design theory involves "a hands-on
directing" but not necessarily a "gap" in natural laws, see Ratzsch, supra note 121, at 290302.
126. See Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Evolution, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BIBLE
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 92, at 212.
127. In a letter to Asa Gray dated May 22, 1860, Darwin wrote that he was "inclined to
look at everything as resulting from designed laws," with all details "left to the working out
of what we may call chance." VERNON BLACKMORE & ANDREW PAGE, EVOLUTION: THE
GREAT DEBATE 118 (1989).
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What may be called atheistic evolution holds that materialistic,
evolutionary processes solely account for all life forms.'28 Whereas deistic
evolution allows for a creator as first cause, atheistic evolution does not.
Atheistic evolution does not merely say that natural processes were
involved in the evolution of life. Rather, atheistic evolution boldly
proclaims that only natural processes account for life's origins and
development. Atheistic evolution is a theological conception of origins
because it takes a position, explicitly or implicitly, on whether God is in
any sense responsible for the origin and development of life,
notwithstanding that the position can never be verified merely from
observing nature. 29
For purposes of constitutional law, the most important reason to identify
and define deistic and atheistic evolution is to ensure that they are
recognized as theological conceptions of origins. A high school science
teacher who advocates atheistic evolution, for example, is promoting a
theological position just as surely as is his counterpart across the hallway
who opines that God created all life forms through evolutionary processes.
Under the Constitution, the state has no more business advancing nonBiblically based theologies of life's origins and development than it has
advancing Christian conceptions of the same. This point should be obvious
to anyone even modestly familiar with the relevant Supreme Court
precedent. The next part of this Article reviews the most important
Supreme Court case law bearing upon this subject.
III. RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT INTERPRETING THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Under the first clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 30 This constitutional
text, consisting of two related but distinct prohibitions, has been judicially
expounded as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Although the clauses literally apply only to federal laws, each applies to
128. See, e.g., JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY 112-13 (1971) (attributing all
innovations of evolution to chance alone).
129. Observe that atheistic evolution does not necessarily subsume atheism, the belief
that there is no God. In the sense I am using the term, it is evolution that is thought to be
without God, not necessarily the whole of reality. Of course, an evolutionist who is an
atheist would endorse atheistic evolution. My point is simply that, in theory, one can believe

in God and yet embrace atheistic evolution, because theism does not necessarily require the
belief that God is to any degree responsible for creating the material world.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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actions by state governments through their incorporation by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3' This part first discusses (briefly, when possible) the most
important Supreme Court case law interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Next, this part succinctly discusses the two Supreme Court cases that have
interpreted the Establishment Clause in the context of the origins
controversy. This survey provides the legal background necessary for
specifically analyzing the constitutional implications of teaching intelligent
design in the public school science classroom.
A.

The EstablishmentClause Tests andNorms

The Supreme Court does not uniformly apply any single test in
determining whether a law violates the Establishment Clause. 2 For many
years, the Court consistently applied the three-pronged test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman,'33 with only one exception.'34 Under the first prong of the
Lemon test, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular
purpose.'35 Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.'36 Third, the statute must not
result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion.'3 7 Courts
have applied the Lemon test to invalidate numerous state policies and
practices, including those operative in public schools.'

131. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Free Exercise
Clause).
132. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (observing that many recent decisions of the Court do not apply the Lemon test).

133. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
134. Indeed, as of the date that the Supreme Court decided its second case involving the
teaching of evolution in the public schools, the Lemon test had been applied in all but one
case. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987). The one exception was
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983), which upheld the Nebraska legislature's
practice of having a state-funded chaplain open each legislative session with prayer.
135. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 613.
138. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-61 (1985) (invalidating Alabama's moment
of silence statute that was designed to give children an opportunity to pray at school); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a Kentucky statute that
required the posting of the Ten Commandments on public school walls).
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Lemon has drawn severe criticism, 13 9 and recent opinions of the Court
illustrate its inconsistent influence. In the 2004 Supreme Court term, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Van Orden v. Perry declined to
apply the Lemon test."4 Instead, in finding no constitutional impediment to
exhibiting a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the
Texas State Capitol grounds (which featured seventeen monuments and
twenty-one historical markers on twenty-two acres of land), Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) focused on the
nature of the monument and the history of the nation.' 4 ' The plurality
observed the pervasive governmental acknowledgment of the role of God
and religion generally, and the Ten Commandments specifically, in our
nation's heritage, 4 and concluded that the monument was a "passive use"
of the religious text by Texas, representing (along with other monuments)
several strands in the state's political and legal history. 43
In the same term, however, Lemon commanded a majority of the Court
in McCreary County v. ACLU.1" In this case, the Court struck down two
county courthouse exhibits that prominently displayed the Ten Commandments (along with other documents of historic interest that evinced our
nation's religious heritage). 145 The Court found that the counties had acted
with the unlawful purpose of advancing religion, in violation of the first
prong of the Lemon test. 46 Far from ignoring Lemon, the Court applied it
139. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia represent Lemon's most vocal
critics on the bench. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the Court's
unwillingness to apply Lemon uniformly and Lemon's faulty doctrinal basis. See, e.g., Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia has likened Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried," and
observed that "five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally
driven pencils through the creature's heart." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For academic critiques of
Lemon, see, for example, Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1987); Hal Culbertson, Religion in the Political
Process:A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915; Philip B. Kurland,
The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); William P.
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court andEstablishment, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 495 (1986); Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 686-91.
See id. at 686-90.
See id. at 691.
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
See id. at 881.
See id. at 866-74.
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expansively, for the Court interpreted its requirement of a valid secular
purpose to mandate one that is "not merely secondary to a religious
objective."' 4 7
Related to the Lemon test is the "endorsement" test first articulated by
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.4 This test
recasts Lemon as follows:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either
question should render the challenged practice invalid.'4 9
When the question involves a religious activity in which the state
arguably participates, a relevant question is "whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement" of the religious activity. 5 °
The endorsement test reflects the judgment that governmental endorsement
of religion "sends a message to nonadherents" of the concept or practice
endorsed "that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."''
Correlatively,
when government disapproves of religion, it "sends the opposite
message."' 52 The endorsement test has been followed by a majority of the
Court on occasion,' 53 but never consistently.
Another test for ascertaining a violation of the Establishment Clause is
that of "noncoercion."' 54 Under this test, a law violates the Establishment
147. Id. at 864.
148. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. See id.
150. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-10, 316 (2000)
(holding unconstitutional the practice of allowing student-elected representatives to pray
before high school football games); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a nativity
scene on government property).
154. See, e.g., County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree
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Clause if the government's promotion of religion either forces the
profession of religion or participation in a religious ceremony. The Court
has occasionally found government action coercive, even when the
government's contribution to the coercion is indirect and lacking any threat
of penalty.' 55 Some Justices, however, would limit the application of the
coercion test to cases involving the threat of actual legal force.'56
Each of these tests may be understood as grounded in one or more norms
perceived to explain the purpose of the Establishment Clause. Commonly
articulated norms include neutrality, or equality, either among religions or
between religion and nonreligion;' religious liberty;'
separation of
church and state;'59 and the avoidance of social divisiveness based upon
religion. 6 Recently, the Court has emphasized the neutrality norm: "The
touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the 'First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion."""'
Reiterating this point, the Court in McCreary County characterized
religious neutrality as the "central Establishment Clause value."' 62 Indeed,
Justice Souter's majority opinion devotes an entire section to explaining
why the neutrality norm has "provided a good sense of direction" in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' 63

that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678)).
155. For example, in Santa Fe, the Court found coercion where, through a student
election authorized by the school district, a student was selected to deliver an invocation
before high school football games. The coercion took the form of social pressure "to
participate in an act of religious worship." Santa FeIndep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
156. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,52 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution understood establishment to
embody actual legal coercion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the coercion of historical concern was that which occurred through
"force of law and threat of penalty").
157. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
158. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)
(stating that the common purpose of the religion clauses "is to secure religious liberty").
159. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
160. See id.
161. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
162. Id.
163. Id.at 875.
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B. Cases on Origins
The United States Supreme Court has twice considered controversies
over the teaching of evolution in the public school science classroom."6 In
Epperson v. Arkansas,'65 the Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas
statute forbidding any teacher in a state-supported school or university to
teach, or adopt a textbook advancing, the theory that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals."6 The Court so held, regardless
of whether the statute was construed to forbid instruction about the theory
of evolution, or "to forbid any or all of the infinite varieties of
communication embraced within the term 'teaching."" 6 7 Concluding that
the statute violated the Establishment Clause, the Court identified as the
"overriding fact" that the state had proscribed a segment of "the body of
knowledge" that was thought to "conflict with a particular religious
doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a
particular religious group."' 6 8
Just as the express language of the Court's opinion identifies the
"overriding fact" of the case, so the structure and language of the opinion
discloses the overriding legal norm that guided the Court's analysisneutrality. At the inception of the Court's legal analysis, the opinion
articulates, and even elevates, the neutrality norm in unmistakable terms:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be
164. For two federal appellate court opinions decided since the Supreme Court last ruled
on the teaching of origins in the public schools, see Peloza v. CapistranoUnified Sch. Dist.,
37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a school district could require a high school
biology teacher to teach the theory of evolution), and Webster v. New Lennox Sch. Dist., 917
F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a school board could prohibit the teaching of
creation science). See also G. Sidney Buchanan, Evolution, Creation-Science, and the
Meaning of PrimaryReligious Purpose,58 SMU L. REv. 303, 310-11 (2005).
165. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
166. See id.
at 108-09. See generally ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627 to -1628 (1960). The
statute was adapted from the notorious Tennessee "monkey law" at issue in Scopes v. State,
289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927), a case of Hollywood fame. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98.
Violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor and resulted in termination of the
offending teacher's employment. See id.at 99.
167. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103. Thus, the Court held that the state could not
constitutionally forbid an instructor from teaching that the theory of evolution is true. When
the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the statute, it refused to express a view on whether the
statute prohibited explanation of the theory or forbade teaching that the theory is true. See
id.at 102. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional
"on either interpretation of its language." See id. at 103.
168. Id.at 103.
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hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it
may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory
against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion. 169
Having grounded its opinion firmly on the neutrality norm, the Court
insisted on the inability of government to suppress dissent from orthodoxy.
It quoted Watson v. Jones17 ° for the proposition that "[t]he law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of
Similarly, the Court reiterated that the First Amendment
no sect."''
prohibits "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."' 7 2 Again,
said the Court, the First Amendment does not authorize the state "to require
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions
of any religious sect or dogma."' 73 This constitutional prohibition against
state-enforced orthodoxy derives directly from the neutrality norm, as the
following excerpt makes clear:
While study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and
historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment's prohibition, the State may not adopt programs or practices
in its public schools or colleges which "aid or oppose" any
religion. This prohibition is absolute. It forbids alike the
preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory
which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma. As Mr.
Justice Clark stated in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, "the state
has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from
views distasteful to them . . . ." The test was stated as follows in
Abington School Districtv. Schempp: "[W]hat are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement

169. Id. at 103-04 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952);
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 18 (1947)).
170. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
171. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 728).
172. Id. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
173. Id. at 106.

HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 357 2009

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3:329

or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution."174
The Court had no difficulty concluding that the Arkansas statute violated
the constitutionally grounded neutrality norm. The Court found that the
state enacted the legislation with a religious motive; it forbade discussion of
the theory of evolution because of its inconsistency with certain Biblically
based viewpoints.175 According to the Court, no evidence suggested that
the law could be justified "by considerations of state policy other than the
religious views of some of its citizens."' 76 Thus, the law "cannot be
defended as an act of religious neutrality."' 77
In the second case on origins considered by the Supreme Court, Edwards
v. Aguillard,78 the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that required
balanced instruction in public elementary and secondary schools on the
theory of evolution and creation science."' The law required no instruction
in origins unless either theory was taught, in which case both theories must
be taught. 80 In holding that the law violated the Establishment Clause, the
Court relied upon the Lemon test, 181 specifically upon its first prong."'
Construing Lemon's first prong to ask whether the actual purpose of the
government is to endorse or disapprove of religion, 83 the Court found both
the absence of a secular purpose,' 84 and the presence of a primarily religious
85
purpose.1
Although the stated secular purpose of the legislation was promoting
academic freedom, the Court rejected that rationale because the law's
sponsor hoped to narrow the science curriculum, the law conferred no new
authority upon teachers to teach numerous scientific theories of origins, and

174. Id. at 106-07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 505 (1952)).
175. See id. at 107-09.
176. Id. at 107.
177. Id. at 109.
178. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
179. See id.at 596-97.
180. Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-:286.7 (1982); see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
181. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 582-83.
182. See id. at 585-97.
183. See id. at 585 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
184. See id. at 586-89.
185. See id.at 589-94.
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the law provided special resources for teaching creation science." 6
Moreover, if the secular purpose was to enhance science instruction, the
law would have encouraged presentation of all scientific theories about the
origins of humankind.'8 7
The Court also found a primarily religious purpose for the law. The
Court discerned in the case at bar the "same historic and contemporaneous
antagonisms between the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution" that drove previous controversies over the
teaching of evolution in public schools.'88 According to the Court, "[t]he
preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind.' ' 89 The
Court noted the "religious motives" that legislators revealed in speaking for
the legislation,'9" and found a purpose to advance religion:
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature required
the teaching of a theory that coincided with this religious view
[i.e., divine creation]. The legislative history documents that the
Act's primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of
public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a
particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of
evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism Act...
explained during the legislative hearings that his disdain for the
theory of evolution resulted from the support that evolution
supplied to views contrary to his own religious beliefs. According
to [him], the theory of evolution was consonant with the "cardinal
principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism, theological
liberalism, aetheistism [sic]." The state senator repeatedly stated
that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should be
included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that the
theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he
characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. The
legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to
reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the
theory of evolution. ''

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id.at 587-88.
See id. at 588.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 591 n.13.
Id. at 592-93 (citation omitted).
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Because the primary purpose of the Louisiana statute was to advance a
particular religious 192
belief, the law "endorse[d] religion in violation of the
First Amendment."
C. Summary
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, the constitutionality of
teaching intelligent design in the public school science classroom depends
in part on whether a decision to teach it (or forbid its teaching) is driven
primarily by a religious purpose. Also relevant is whether any such
decision will have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
The precise test that the Court would use to decide a case involving the
teaching of intelligent design is not perfectly clear. Nevertheless, it is
probable that the neutrality norm would guide the Court's analysis.
Whether the teaching of intelligent design could ever survive scrutiny under
these principles is the topic to which this Article now turns.
IV. WHY ALL THE Fuss: CONTROVERSIAL THRESHOLD QUESTIONS

Ultimately, this Article argues that the constitutionality of teaching, or
forbidding the teaching of, intelligent design in the public school science
classroom depends on case-specific factors. Before discussing these
factors, it is essential to address two threshold questions that have generated
academic controversy. The threshold questions must be answered in the
negative before a consideration of the specific facts of any case is even
necessary. The first question is whether evolution or intelligent design
inherently constitutes a religion or consists of religious ideas. The second
question is whether science is inherently and absolutely nontheological (at
least in its methodological assumptions). This Part explores each question
in turn.
A. Does Evolution or IntelligentDesign Inherently Constitute a
"Religion" or Inherently Consist of "Religious" Ideas?
1. The Meaning of Religion
Opponents of teaching evolution by natural selection in the public
schools have charged (albeit, unsuccessfully thus far in the courts) that
evolution is a religion.'93 Similarly, opponents of teaching intelligent
design in the public school science classroom have argued that intelligent
192. Id.at 593.

193. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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design is a religion.' 94 A person unfamiliar with the judicial history
interpreting the First Amendment would likely assume that the definition of
"religion" under the Constitution is plainly articulated by now. It is not.
The Court, however, has provided some modest guidance on the meaning
of religion.' 95
In Davis v. Beason,'96 the Supreme Court's earliest broad articulation of
the meaning of "religion,"' 97 the Court interpreted the term to refer to
"one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose" as a result of reverence and as a matter of obedience.9 According
to the Court, religion was "often confounded" with a form of worship, but
is distinguishable from it.' 99
The religion clauses were intended to allow everyone . . . to

entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the
duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and
conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship
as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others,

194. See infra notes 245-57 and accompanying text.
195. A vast body of literature discusses the meaning of religion-both descriptively and
normatively-under the religion clauses. See, e.g., A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion
in Operationaland InstitutionalTerms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); James M. Donovan,
God Is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of "Religion," 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal,23
HOFSTRA L. REv. 309 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional
Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753 (1984); Val D. Ricks, To God God's, to CaesarCaesar's,and to
Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1053 (1993); C. John Sommerville,
Defining Religion and the PresentSupreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (1994);
Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REv. 181
(2002); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997);
Eduardo Petialver, Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056 (1978). The cases cited in this Article are discussed at length in this literature. For a
discussion of the attempts to provide some clarity to the meaning of "religion" in the lower
courts (and for an argument that intelligent design is not a "religion"), see DeWolf, Meyer &
DeForrest, supra note 1, at 79-87.
196. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that antipolygamy laws do not
establish a religion), overruled on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634
(1996).
197. The Court had previously considered the scope of the constitutional protection of
freedom of "religion." See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-68 (1879).
Although the Reynolds Court distinguished between religious belief and conduct, see id. at
164, 166, it declined to opine plainly upon the scope of "religious" belief or conduct.
198. See Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
199. Id.
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and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets,
or the modes of worship of any sect. 00
Thus, under Davis v. Beason, "religion" has a relational perspective, a
devotional and moral orientation, a theistic aim, and often a doctrinal
grounding.
Since Davis v. Beason, the Supreme Court has broadened its conception
of religion, but not with clear boundaries. In Torcaso v. Watkins,2 °' in
which the Court invalidated a provision of the Maryland Constitution that
conditioned service in public office on the profession of a belief in God,20 2
the Court observed that various religions in the United States (including
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism) do not hold to
a belief in God. 2 3 The Torcaso opinion obviously precludes any reading of
Davis v. Beason that the constitutional meaning of the term "religion"
necessarily requires a belief in God. Plainly, under Torcaso, belief in God
is not inherent to religion. A related principle must also not be overlooked.
Torcaso never holds that "religion" is inherent to a belief in God. Although
this issue is discussed in detail below," for present purposes it is sufficient
to observe that the state constitutional provision at issue in Torcaso itself
required profession of belief in God explicitly as a religious test.20 5 The
question of whether one can maintain a belief in God that is not, strictly
speaking, an element of one's "religion," was not before the Court.
The remaining indicia of religion advanced in Davis v. Beason (i.e.,
those indicia other than theistic aim) have resurfaced in some form in later
Supreme Court opinions. In United States v. Seeger, °6 the Court construed
a federal statute exempting from military service persons who object to
such service on account of their religious training and belief. The federal
law defined "religious training and belief" as that "in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation," but excluding beliefs that are primarily "political, sociological, or
philosophical" and those attributable to "a merely personal moral code."2 7
The Court construed the statute to differentiate the statutorily designated
"Supreme Being" from God, so that the statute afforded protection to all
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
§ 456()

Id.
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Id. at 495-96. See generally MD.CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 37.
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n. 11.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 (citing MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 37).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id.at 165 (citing Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app.
(1958) (amended 1967 & 1971)).
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who held a belief "that is sincere and meaningful" and that "occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief
in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." ' 8 The Court
adopted this test because it "avoid[ed] imputing to Congress an intent to
classify different religious beliefs," and comported with the "congressional
policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded
in their religious tenets." ' 9 Further, the Court deemed its construction as
"embrac[ing] the ever-broadening understanding of the modem religious
2 10
community."
The Court revisited the statute at issue in Seeger in Welsh v. United
States.2 1' In Welsh, the conscientious objector grounded his opposition to
combat in deeply held moral beliefs which were not associated with
allegiance to God or affiliation with any organized religious faith.212 The
Court held that the objector was entitled to exemption under the statute." 3
The Court opined that under Seeger, the determination of whether a
registrant holds religious beliefs in opposition to warfare rests on whether
such beliefs "play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the
registrant's life."2 4 Opposition to war must "stem from the registrant's
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong," and the
registrant must cling to such beliefs "with the strength of traditional
religious convictions. ' The Court observed that most "great religions"
posit the existence of God (or some "Supreme Reality") who
"communicates to man in some way a consciousness of what is right and
'
should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be shunned."216
According to the Court, if a person sincerely embraces purely moral
convictions that compel his conscience to refrain from combat, such beliefs
play a role analogous to a belief in God in traditional religions.21 7 Such an

208. Id. at 165-66.
209. Id. at 176.
210. Id. at 180-83. This "ever-broadening understanding" apparently refers to modem
efforts to conceptualize God as other than the personal, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent,
omnipresent Being who created all else that is. This rationale of Seeger should be
interpreted to mean not that Congress intended any particular modern conception of God, but
that Congress intended to exempt even those whose views of God are not traditional.
211. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
212. Id. at 338.
213. Id. at343-44.
214. Id. at 339.
215. Id. at340.
216. Id.
217. See id.
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objector is entitled to exemption under the statute "[b]ecause his beliefs
function as a religion in his life. 218
The majority opinions in Seeger and Welsh do not purport to define
"religion" for purposes of constitutional law. Nonetheless, the concepts of
religion expressed in those opinions are relevant to determining the
meaning of religion under the First Amendment. 19 First, as observed in
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Seeger,22 ° Justice Harlan's opinion
concurring in the result in Welsh,221 and Justice White's dissent in Welsh,222
the construction of the statute at issue had obvious constitutional
implications. For Justices Douglas and Harlan, the statute would have
violated the Establishment Clause if it were properly construed to exempt
only those whose objections to military service were grounded in a belief in
God. Insofar as the definition of "religious" and "Supreme Being" under
the statute had constitutional implications, it is sensible to look to these
opinions for guidance as to the meaning of "religion" under the First
Amendment. Second, the Court in Seeger and Welsh was willing to
interpret "religious" belief very broadly. A broad definition of "religion,"
for First Amendment purposes, appeals to many, insofar as a broad
definition maximizes protection of the free exercise of religion, and
minimizes the risk that government will impose religious orthodoxy on
nonadherents.
Of special interest is that Seeger and Welsh reinforce much of the
Court's constitutional understanding of the meaning of religion expressed
in Davis v. Beason, as limited by Torcaso v. Watkins. According to the
combined guidance of the latter two cases, "religion" has a relational
perspective, a devotional and moral orientation, and often a doctrinal

218. Id.
219. For a brief discussion of how two federal appellate courts have articulated the
meaning of "religion," see infra note 278.
220. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188-93 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(arguing that a construction of the statute that limited the concept of a Supreme Being to an
orthodox conception of God would render the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the
Free Exercise clause).
221. Justice Harlan concluded that the statute was properly construed to exempt from
military service only those whose objection to war arose from theistic beliefs, and that the
statute so construed violated the Establishment Clause. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344-45
(Harlan, J., concurring).
222. Justice White (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart) concluded that
the Court's opinion was an unjustifiable construction of the statute, and that the objector was
not exempt from service regardless of whether the exemption (as properly construed) was
constitutional. See id.at 367 (White, J., dissenting).
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grounding. 223 These concepts resonate with the language of Seeger and
Welsh, which associates religion with tenets; 224 guidance on what is right
and wrong; 225 relationship to a power, being,
or faith (such as subordination
227
or dependency); 226 and impact on behavior.
As others have perennially noted,228 the precise definition of "religion"
under the First Amendment is unknown. However, the case law surveyed
above provides some direction in the quest for ascertaining the broad
contours of the concept of religion for purposes of constitutional law. With
these broad contours discerned, the analyst is equipped to explore the
question of whether intelligent design or evolution is properly considered a
religion.
2. Evolution and Religion
Some have argued that evolution is itself a religion, or at least advances
or subsumes inherently religious concepts. 229 The assertion is misleading.
A more accurate statement is that evolution is not necessarily a religious
concept, although it can be a religious belief.
That evolutionary theory most assuredly can be a religious belief is
amply documented.23" For example, Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha,
argued that what appeared to be creation by beings who emerged from the
"World of Radiance" was really nothing more than the emergence of other
beings from such other world, which occurred "when this world [began] to
223. See supratext accompanying notes 196-204.
224. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.

225. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
226. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
227. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-40.
228. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 195, at 759 ("Achieving a decent fit with what the
Supreme Court has said about defining religion in the last few decades is not particularly
difficult, because the Court has said very little."); Pefialver, The Concept of Religion, supra
note 195, at 801 ("In sum, the state of the search for a constitutional definition of religion in
the courts could be charitably described as unsettled.").
229. See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(stating that the author of the model act upon which an Arkansas "Balanced Treatment" act
was based considers both creationism and evolution as religions); INST. FOR CREATION
RESEARCH, ScIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 196, 200 (Henry M. Morris ed., 1974); Addicott, supra
note 15, at 1565 ("[T]he argument can surely be made that the theory of evolution also

qualifies as a religion since Darwinian activists brazenly tout the theory of evolution as the
central principle of either evolutionism or Secular Humanism."); John W. Whitehead & John
Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment
Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,47-54 (1978).
230. For additional examples of religions that embrace evolutionary concepts, see

Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 229, at 48 n.233.
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evolve. 2 31 Even more striking is the evolution myth of Jainism. Jainism
holds that the universe is uncreated by any god, and instead is maintained
and changes by natural principles.232 The Jain myth is defended in the
following excerpts from the Mahapurana,233 which advances arguments
typical of atheistic evolutionists:
Some foolish men declare that Creator made the world.
The doctrine that the world was created is ill-advised, and should
be rejected.
No single being had the skill to make this worldFor how can an immaterial god create that which is material?
How could God have made the world without any raw material?
If you say he made this first, and then the world, you are faced
with an endless regression.

If out of love for living things and need of them he made the
world,
Why did he not make creation wholly blissful, free from
misfortune?
Know that the world is uncreated, as time itself is, without
beginning and end,
And is based on principles, life and the rest.3
Evolutionary concepts are not restricted to ancient Eastern religions. As
others have observed, a modem religion that relies heavily on evolutionary
theory is secular humanism. 233 Humanist Manifesto I declares the creed
231.

SPROUL, supra note 60, at 194-95 (citing SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADTiON 127-28 (W.

Theodore de Bary ed., 1966)).
232. See id at 192.
233. The Mahapurana,or "The Great Legend," was written by Jain teacher Jinasena in
the ninth century. See id.
234. Id. at 192-93 (citing SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADmON, supra note 231, at 76-78).
235. See, e.g., Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 229, at 39, 44, 46 n.225, 47-54. I credit
Whitehead and Conlan's work for their citation to all of the works of Secular Humanism to
which this paper refers.
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that the universe is self-existing and uncreated,236 and that man is a "part of
nature" that has "emerged as the result of a continuous process."237
Similarly, a profession of Humanist Manifesto II is that "science affirms
that the human species is an emergence from natural evolutionary
forces."23 Sir Julian Huxley, a prominent humanist, regarded evolutionary
theory as the most central tenet of Secular Humanism.239
Plainly, evolution can be a religious belief, and one that is central to the
doctrinal coherence of more than one religion. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has properly recognized as "religions" several faiths that do not
embrace a Creator-God, but do embrace evolutionary theory.2"
Nonetheless, it does not follow that evolutionary theory is inherently
religious. 24' As discussed above, "evolution" has several meanings, and
most of them are not inherently "religious" within the meaning of Supreme
Court precedent. Consider the definition of evolution which means
"change over time. '
Nobody can credibly argue that this meaning of
evolution is "religious." Even certain meanings of evolution that are more
controversial-such as evolution by universal common descent 243-are not
inherently "religious." They do not necessarily advance a relational
perspective. How one relates to one's fellow man (or to God) is not
necessarily informed by universal common descent. Neither does a belief
in universal common descent necessarily have devotional or moral
implications; there is no reason to believe that an evolutionary creationist
who is a Christian would worship and obey God differently from a youngearth creationist, for example. Moreover, although universal common
descent may well form a doctrinal grounding in various religions, one can
discern a wide spectrum of faiths that are comfortable with this conceptfrom evolutionary creationism in Christianity to godless evolution in
Jainism and Secular Humanism.
236. HUMANIST MANIFESTO I, § 1 (1933), reprintedin HUMANIST MANIFESTOS I AND II, at
8 (Paul Kurtz ed., 1973).
237. Id. § 2.
238. HUMANIST MANIFESTO II, Religion, § 2 (1973), reprintedin HUMANIST MANIFESTOS
I AND II, supra note 236, at 17.

239. Julian Huxley, EvolutionaryHumanism, HUMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1962, at 201, 206.
240. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1 1 (1961) ("Among religions in
this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.").
241. Indeed, many of the ancient Greek philosophers embraced evolutionary concepts.
For a brief discussion of their views, see David Barton, A Death-Struggle Between Two
Civilizations, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 297, 303-04 (2001).
242. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

243. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Further, that some proponents of evolution by natural selection share a
conviction with certain religions (and may themselves be members of one
such religious faith) does not render the theory inherently "religious." A
premise or conclusion held in two distinct disciplines does not result in one
discipline being subsumed within the other.'M For example, both a criminal
psychologist and a Catholic priest may conclude that a named juvenile
offender can be rehabilitated (albeit, for different reasons) without
rendering criminal psychology religion, or religion criminal psychology.
Further, the criminal psychiatrist does not inherently embrace a "religious"
idea when she opines in court that a convicted juvenile should be
rehabilitated, rather than punished to the fullest extent of the law.
Similarly, both a pathologist and a rabbi may agree that a person should not
eat raw bacon, but that common sentiment does not justify the conclusion
that the pathologist keeps kosher. Neither does it mean that pathology
promotes, or even embraces, the teachings of Judaism. Likewise, to assert
that all forms of evolutionary theory are necessarily "religious" is illogical.
3.

Intelligent Design and Religion

Opponents of intelligent design, like opponents of evolution, have
argued that the view that they oppose subsumes religious belief. The
rationales of the critics vary. Some commentators lump all theories that
assume a creative role for God as "creationism" and then assert that
"creationism" necessitates belief in Christianity.24 For those who assert
this claim, to teach intelligent design is necessarily to teach religion,
because (in their view) believing in intelligent design is tantamount to
believing in a religious faith-Christianity. This assertion is plainly false.
Intelligent design neither refers to the Genesis account (or discussions in
other portions of the Bible of God's creative work) nor-unlike scientific
creationism--does it attempt to harmonize scientific data with any
particular theological interpretation of Genesis (or other Biblical texts).2"
Neither does intelligent design even begin to address the vast scope of what
Christian scripture says about the nature and purposes of God (e.g., His
244. Cf Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing
the nonsense of finding a violation of the Establishment Clause when the state criminalizes
murder merely because the Bible forbids murder).
245. See, e.g., Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The
Establishment Clause and the Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public Schools, 54
VAND. L. REv. 2555, 2556-61 (2001).
246. Further, I am confident that most Jewish students of Hebrew Scripture would beg to
differ with the notion that believing the Genesis account of creation necessarily renders one
a Christian!
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inexplicable love for mankind,247 His grace, 248 His holiness, 249 His
omniscience,25" His omnipresence,2 5 His omnipotence,252 His plan of
redemption, 253 His wrath,25 4 and His triune nature25 ).
The more interesting question is whether intelligent design, although not
distinctively Christian, nonetheless is a "religion," or inherently consists of
one or more "religious" ideas. Some have argued that all theories
(including, arguably, intelligent design) that "presuppose a supreme being"
are "inherently religious. 256 Although a handful of jurists in the country
have so opined,257 this argument is dubious as applied to intelligent design
theory. One problem with the argument is that intelligent design theory
does not explicitly argue that the designer is supernatural, let alone
divine.25 8 Moreover, even if one believes that the logic of intelligent design
compels the conclusion that the designer is supernatural,2 59 itdoes not
follow that intelligent design is inherently religious. The discussion of why

247. See, e.g., Jeremiah 31:3; John 3:16; Romans 5:8, 8:38-39; Ephesians 2:4; 1 John
4:7-11.
248. See, e.g., Psalm 86:15-16; John 1:14-17; Romans 3:23-24; Ephesians 2:4-9; Titus
2:11, 3:4-7.
249. See, e.g., Leviticus 11:44-45; Isaiah6:1-3; 1 Peter 1:15-16; Revelation 4:8.
250. See, e.g., 1 Samuel 16:7; 1 Chronicles 28:9; Job 28:24; Psalms 44:21, 69:5, 139:1516; Isaiah 44:6-8, 45:21, 46:9-10; Jeremiah 1:5; Matthew 24:36; Acts 1:24; Hebrews 4:1213.
251. See, e.g., Psalm 139:1-12; Jeremiah23:23-24; Matthew 28:20.
252. See, e.g., Job 42:1-2; Isaiah40:18-26, 41:1-4, 43:10-13, 44:24-28, 50:2-3; Jeremiah
32:27; Daniel 4:34-37; Mark 10:25-27; Ephesians 1:11.
253. See, e.g., Isaiah 52:13-53:12; Mark 10:45; Romans 3:21-26; Galatians 3:1-14; 1
Peter 1:18-21, 3:18.
254. See, e.g., Isaiah 63:1-6; Revelation 19:11-21.
255. See, e.g.,John 1:1-3, 1:18, 10:30, 14:9-11, 14:16-18, 14:23, 15:26; Colossians 1:1517; Titus 2:13, 3:4-6; Hebrews 1:1-12.
256. E.g., Diana M. Rosenberg, Note, Monkey Business and Unnatural Selection:
Opening the Schoolhouse Door to Religion by Discrediting the Tenets of Darwinism, 9 J.L.
& POL'Y 611 (2001); see also Wexler, supra note 15, at 814-25; David R. Bauer, Note,
Resolving the Controversy over "Teaching the Controversy": The Constitutionality of
TeachingIntelligent Design in Public Schools, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1019, 1052-54 (2006).
257. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 598-99 (1987) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716-23 (M.D. Pa.
2005); McLean v. Ark. Bd.of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265-66 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Malnak
v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977), aftd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
258. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
259. See id.
(explaining how one could argue that the logic of intelligent design
inevitably points to a supernatural designer).
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evolution is not inherently religious applies equally with respect to
intelligent design.
First, as discussed above, that a premise or conclusion is held in two
distinct disciplines does not mean that one discipline is subsumed within
the other.26 If belief in the existence of an ultimate, intelligent, nonmaterial
entity is not confined to religion, the notion that intelligent design embraces
an inherently religious concept is highly suspect.26'
History confirms that belief in the existence of some ultimate, intelligent
entity-which may even be identified as God-is not confined to
religion.2 62 For example, the renowned Greek philosopher Aristotle saw an
ascending order in nature (from the imperfect to the perfect) driven by a
purpose or goal. 263 He assumed "intelligent Design as the primary cause of
things, by the perfection and regularity which he observed in Nature. ' 2 6
Viewing nature as a principle of motion and rest, Aristotle postulated four
causes in nature.265 One of these causes was the Prime Mover (or Unmoved
Mover)--Aristotle's concept of God.266
Aristotle reasoned that his Unmoved Mover, which he identified as
God,267 is eternal, because (1) movement is eternal, and (2) there is no

260. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
261. Cf Addicott, supra note 15, at 1586 ("[T]he same reasoning that prompts refusal to
equate the theory of evolution with a religious belief... can easily be applied in refusing to
link the study of intelligent design with a religious belief. Both ideas have metaphysical or
religious implications, but both are based on a scientific framework, not faith.").
262. Cf Beckwith, Public Education,supra note 15, at 487 ("[S]ome philosophers have
argued that belief in God may not even be a sufficient condition for a belief to be religious if
'God' is employed as an explanatory postulate rather than worshiped as an object of
devotion.").
263. See HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN, FROM THE GREEKS To DARWIN: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE EVOLUTION IDEA THROUGH TwENTY-FOUR CENTURIES 78-88 (2d ed. 1929). In
evaluating intelligent design theory, others have noted Aristotle's conception of God. See,
e.g., Beckwith, Science and Religion, supranote 15, at 460.
264. See OSBORN, supra note 263, at 79.
265. See id.at 80-81. The four causes may be described as material (i.e., a natural
object's substance), formal (i.e., its shape or form), efficient (i.e., the instrumental means of
production), and final (i.e., the purpose for the natural object). See ARISTOTLE, II PHYSICS
3.194b24-.195a3, reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED
OXFORD TRANSLATION 332-33 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE].

266. See OSBORN,supra note 263, at 80.
267. See ARISTOTLE, XII METAPYHSICS 7.1072bl-b30, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 1694-95.
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movement without a mover. 26" There must be a mover because matter "will
surely not move itself."2 69 This Mover is a first principle that is indivisible
and without magnitude, which produces movement by being loved.27 0 God
is in some way the entity of thought thinking itself,27 ' the ultimate good.
Aristotle explains the implications of his concept of God as follows: "[T]he
actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's essential
actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a
life and duration continuous and
living being, eternal, most good, so that
272
eternal belong to God; for this is God.
Aristotle's views, unlike many other views of Greek philosophers, are
difficult to characterize as "religious." He "provides no significant text on
the subject of religion, 273 and "one would look in vain for texts in which he
prescribes homage or piety. 274 His views are better described as
metaphysical. 275 Hence, Aristotle illustrates that to extrapolate design from
nature, and to view nature as pointing to a nonmaterial, ultimate
intelligence, is not to advance an inherently religious proposition.
Of course, that Aristotle's god "is truly not the God of Israel" (at least
not necessarily) should be obvious.276 Although Aristotle's god is eternal
268. See id. 6.1071b3-b12, reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra
note 265, at 1692-93; ARISTOTLE, VIII PHYSICS 6.258b10-.260a19, reprinted in 1 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 432-34.
269. ARISTOTLE, XII METAPYHSICS 6.1071b30, reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE, supra note 265, at 1693.
270. See id. 7.1072bl-.1073a13, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE,
supra note 265, at 1694-95.
271.

See id. 9.1074b15-.1075a10, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE,

supra note 265, at 1698-99.
272. Id. 7.1072b27-b3 1, reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note
265, at 1695.
273. JUDE P. DOUGHERTY, THE LOGIC OF RELIGION 20 (2003).

274. Id.
275. "The question of God's existence belongs to the sphere of metaphysics." Id. at 5.
The term "metaphysics" was first used in reference to the works of Aristotle. William
pt.
I (2003),
10 THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA
Turner,
Metaphysics, in
Precisely what "metaphysics" means is
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10226a.htm.
subject to debate. See id. pt. II (discussing several definitions of metaphysics). Metaphysics
can be conceived of as science, as well as philosophy. See id. Its object of inquiry is "the
most general and fundamental principles underlying all reality and all knowledge." Id. The
important point is that metaphysical thought-including the process of reasoning to an
Ultimate Principle that is responsible for design in the universe-is not confined to religious
thought. Cf DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 87 ("This potential for
metaphysical extrapolation .. does not make design theory a religious doctrine.").
276. See LEO STRAUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 108 (Fred Baumann trans., Jewish Publ'n

Soc'y, 1st English ed. 1987) (1935).
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and nonmaterial, it is not one who creates matter ex nihilo. By possible
contrast, the designing agent arguably implied by intelligent design theory
may be a creative being with characteristics possessed by the God of the
Bible or the Qur'an (for example). On the other hand, numerous attributes
of God revealed in sacred texts are not attributed to the agent of design
under intelligent design theory-nor could they be. If (like Aristotle) one
finds the presence of purposeful design in nature compelling, but (unlike
Aristotle) one cannot conceive how such design could exist apart from a
designing being who creates, one may logically infer the probability of a
creative designer. Such logic, however, does not further compel one to
embrace the position that the intelligent agent of design is the God
described in any world religion.277
Moreover, the better view is that intelligent design is not inherently
religious under the Supreme Court cases interpreting the meaning of
religion under the First Amendment."7
Intelligent design is not innately
religious for the same reasons that many senses of the term "evolution" are
not necessarily religious. Intelligent design offers no relational perspective;
it says nothing about whether or how the designer relates to the designed
objects, and nothing about how that which is designed interrelates.279
Intelligent design has no devotional or moral orientation; it does not so
much as call for a scintilla of respect for the designer, nor does it state that
the designer (or any part of the designed order) is a moral being. Finally,
contrary to the arguments of some commentators,28 ° the correspondence
between the fact of an intelligent designer and the doctrinal grounding of
many major world religions in a creator does not establish that intelligent
design is religious. Although the presence of a creator is very important in
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (for example), the same can be said of the
importance of evolutionary theory in several nontheistic religions.2 '
277. See DEWOLF, WEST, LUSKIN & WITT, supra note 16, at 65 ("Given that such pagan
philosophers as Plato were advocates of design, it is hard to see that religion itself is
necessarily implied by ID, much less some particular religion.").
278. For a similar analysis that relies on the Third and Ninth Circuits' three-part test of
what constitutes a "religion," see DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 80-87.
According to the Third and Ninth Circuits, a religion (1) addresses fundamental, ultimate
questions regarding matters that are deep and imponderable; (2) is a comprehensive belief
system, not an isolated belief; and (3) can often be recognized by external, formal indicia
(such as formal services, ceremony, clergy, organizational form, and observance of special
days, among others). See Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996);
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
279. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Wexler, supranote 15, at 817-18.
281. See Beckwith, Public Education,supranote 15, at 489.

HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 372 2009

2009]

EXPLORING INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Moreover, intelligent design does not purport to attribute design to a single
designer, so it is just as consistent with polytheistic religions as it is with
monotheistic faiths. Thus, as is the case with religions embracing
evolutionary theory, a wide spectrum of religious beliefs are consistent with
intelligent design-from young-earth creationism to Hinduism, and even
Native American religions. Moreover, intelligent design posits no higher
purpose in design. In many faiths, creation is important precisely because
of its role in the purpose of a creator. The absence of doctrinal content in
intelligent design (relative to that which characterizes recognized religious
faiths) is further grounds for concluding that it is not inherently religious.2" 2
Some have argued that the Supreme Court has rejected this logical and
historically plausible position that belief in an intelligent designer is not
inherently religious. 28 3 After all, the argument goes, the Court in Edwards
v. Aguillard stated that the purpose of Louisiana's Creationism Act was to
modify the science curriculum "to conform with a particular religious
viewpoint, ' '2s and that the primary purpose of the state legislature was
"clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created
humankind., 285 The question, then, is whether the Supreme Court found
that belief in a Supreme Being is inherently a "religious viewpoint."
Those who answer this question affirmatively find their best support in
the following excerpt from Edwards:
The term "creation science" was defined as embracing this
particular religious doctrine [i.e., that a supernatural being created
humankind] by those responsible for the passage of the
Creationism Act.... [The] leading expert on creation science...
testified at the legislative hearings that the theory of creation
science included belief in the existence of a supernatural
creator.... The legislative history therefore reveals that the term
"creation science," as contemplated by the legislature that adopted
this Act, embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator
was responsible for the creation of humankind.286

282. For a similar analysis of why intelligent design is not religious, see id. at 494-96.
283. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736 (M.D. Pa.
2005); Brauer, Forrest & Gey, supra note 15, at 18; cf Buchanan, supranote 164, at 309-10
(arguing that the Court in Edwards v. Aguillard recognized that "an effort to establish God's
existence as a scientific fact is a futile endeavor and serves only to advance a religious belief
in the guise of scientific verbiage").
284. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987).
285. Id. at 592.
286. Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
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Although a possible (and certainly, the most simplistic) interpretation of
this language is that belief in a Supreme Being is inherently religious, this
interpretation is not the most sensible reading of the opinion, taken as a
whole. The key to understanding this excerpt is the phrase modifying
"creation science" in the last sentence of the excerpt-"as contemplated by
the legislature that adopted this Act."2 7 This "creation science," which the
Court described as embodying a religious belief,28 arose in a legislative
context highly sympathetic to a view of life's origins that parallel several
details of one interpretation of Genesis (young-earth creationism). This
legislative context was plainly of serious concern to the Court. In
concluding that summary judgment had been granted properly in the
proceedings below, the Court stated that the motion for summary judgment
rested not only on the language of the state statute at issue, but also (in
relevant part) on "the legislative history and historical context" of the law,
the "specific sequence of events" preceding the law's enactment, and a
report of the state's education department that had been based upon a
survey of school superintendents.289 As observed previously, the Court
found that the legislative history of the Creationism Act revealed the
"religious motives" of several legislators supporting the bill.29° Further, the
Court assigned weight to the meaning of "creation science" as understood
by respondents to a 1981 survey conducted by the state's Department of
Education.29' The school superintendents responsible for implementing the
balanced treatment act were asked in this survey to interpret "creation
science. ' '
Approximately 75% understood "creation science" to be a
religious doctrine, and most of them thought it referred to "the literal
'
interpretation of the Book of Genesis." 293
This link between creation science and one specific interpretation of
Genesis did not escape the attention of Justice Powell, who in a concurring
opinion noted that a previous draft of the bill that eventually became the
Creationism Act defined "creation-science" essentially as scientific
evidence for the young-earth interpretation of Genesis.294 Although the bill
287. Id.at 592.
288. See id.at 593 (stating that the Creationism Act was designed "to promote the theory
of creation science which embodies a particular religious tenet").
289. See id.at 595.
290. See id.at 591-92 & n.13.
291. See id.at 595, 596 n.18.
292. Id.at 596 n.18.
293. Id.
294. See id. at 600-01 (Powell, J.,concurring). The previous draft of the bill defined
creation science to include the following:
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was later amended to delete a list of specific scientific evidences for the
young-earth view of Genesis, the legislator who proposed the amendment
stated that it was not intended to defeat the purpose of the bill in any way;
rather, he apparently did not want to suggest an "all inclusive list" of
scientific evidences.295 Justice Powell concluded that the major elements of
creation science "parallel[ed] the Genesis story of creation," and that this
was a religious belief that explained the existence of the Creationism Act. z96
In view of the legislative context of the Creationism Act, which
obviously influenced the Edwards Court, the better view of the opinion is
the following: the Court concluded that the statute at issue required the
teaching of the religious view that a Supreme Being created the universe,
not simply a scientific view that a Supreme Being created the universe. 97 In
other words, the Court surmised that the real purpose of the legislature was
to promote a religious view of creation, and that it would use science as but
a tool to do so. The Court appears to have believed that scientific evidence
advanced by creation science in the classroom was offered ultimately to
confirm the religious belief that the state legislature was attempting to
promote.
Thus, properly understood, Edwards does not, as a matter of law, hold
that belief in an intelligent creator or designer is an inherently religious
view. Rather, the opinion supports the following propositions:
(1) Belief in a Supreme Being who created the universe most
certainly can be a religious belief;
(2) The Louisiana legislature that enacted the Creationism Act
held to the belief that a Supreme Being created the universe;
(3) The Louisiana legislature's belief was, under the facts of the
case, a religious belief; and
the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate (a) sudden creation
of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (b) the insufficiency of mutation
and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a
single organism; (c) changes only within fixed limits or originally created kinds
of plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e) explanation
of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a
worldwide flood; and (f) a relatively recent inception of the earth and living
kinds.
Id.
295. See id. at 601.
296. Id. at 603-04.
297. For a similar (but briefer) analysis of Edwards on this point, see Addicott, supra
note 15, at 1583-84.
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(4) The Louisiana legislature sought, through the Creationism Act,
to promote their religious belief in a Supreme Being who created
the universe.
This understanding of Edwards not only is highly plausible in light of
the offending act's legislative context, but also comports well with the
Court's statement that instructing children in numerous scientific theories
of the origin of man "might be validly done with the clear secular intent of
enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction. ' If a scientific theory
of the origin of man happens to coincide in some respect with a religious
theory of human origin, Edwards does not forbid it, at least when the
secular purpose for teaching it is clear. In such circumstances, the science
should not be rendered "religious" through a juristic metamorphosis that
banishes it to the sanctuary, synagogue, or mosque.
B. Is Science InherentlyNontheological?
The origins controversy has spurred vigorous debate about the nature of
science. Addressing the issue broadly, some philosophers of science have
attempted to establish demarcation criteria for distinguishing science from
other disciplines. Although at least two district courts have adopted one or
more of such demarcation criteria,299 many philosophers of science
generally appear skeptical that science can be so neatly circumscribed.3"0

298. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594.
299. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735-38 (M.D.
Pa. 2005) (stating that the scientific method "limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations
about the natural world" and "requires scientists to seek explanations in the world around us
based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify"; characterizing "rigorous
attachment to 'natural' explanations [as] an essential attribute to science by definition and by
convention"); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(stating that the "essential characteristics of science" are that it (1) is guided by natural law,
(2) is explained by reference to natural law, (3) is testable empirically, (4) offers tentative
conclusions, and (5) is falsifiable). The former opinion identifies Professor Robert Pennock,
and the latter, Michael Ruse, as experts who advanced one or more of such demarcation
criteria. The views of Professors Pennock and Ruse are discussed infra Part IV.B. 1.
300. Dr. John Angus Campbell scathingly characterizes the demarcation criteria
advanced by Professor Michael Ruse (and adopted by the district court in McLean) as "a
laughingstock among his professional peers and an ethical and conceptual embarrassment to
his profession." John Angus Campbell, Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy
of Public Education, in DARwISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 3, 29.
For a representative overview of the objection (by philosophers of science) to such
demarcation criteria, see DeWolf, Meyer & DeForrest, supra note 1, at 68-74. Cf Moreland
& Reynolds, supra note 96, at 20 ("Historians and philosophers of science are almost
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This Article does not explore the debate over demarcation criteria in
detail. Rather, this paper focuses on what is probably the most important
scientific/philosophical3"' question raised by demarcation criteria in the
origins controversy: must science refrain from referring to supernatural
causation in order to remain scientific? Even more pointedly, is science
inherently nontheological? Strictly speaking, the two questions are not
identical. A supernatural phenomenon may not correspond to any human
conception of God or His activity. Insofar as many people understand God
as some type of supernatural entity, however, this discussion will speak of
the "supernatural" as a potentially theological concept.
The question is not only philosophically intriguing; it also is constitutionally relevant, for two reasons. First, even if intelligent design is not
inherently religious, the probability that religious motivations may have
impelled a decision to teach intelligent design in the classroom appears
greater if intelligent design does not qualify as "science." Second, and
more generally, if science need not refrain from referring to probable
supernatural causation, a governmental decision to prohibit scientists (and
science teachers) from referring to probable supernatural causation raises
concerns under the Establishment Clause.30 2
In analyzing whether science must shun references to supernatural
causation, this part of the Article briefly discusses what many philosophers
of science believe to be a fundamental commitment of scientific inquirymethodological naturalism-and why it is necessary. Next this Article
posits two competing versions of methodological naturalism. Finally, this
Article explains why intelligent design is consistent with one version of
methodological naturalism.
1. Science, Supernatural Causation, and Methodological Naturalism
Many prominent scientists and philosophers of science-as well as the
judge in Kitzmiller3 3-believe that science must strictly foreclose supernatural explanations (and divine explanations, in particular). Professor
Michael Ruse is representative. When doing science, Ruse explains, "one
denies God a role in the creation. ' '304 In fairness, Ruse means only that
universally agreed that theistic science is science and cannot be ruled out as such by
demarcation criteria.").
301. The question at hand is primarily philosophical, not scientific. See Beckwith, Public
Education, supra note 15, at 469.
302. See infra text accompanying notes 392-400.
303. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735-38.
304. Michael Ruse, Methodological Naturalism Under Attack, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN
CREATIONISM AND ITS CRICS, supra note 1, at 363, 365.
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scientific inquiry, as such, posits no role for God as it searches for an
explanation for observed phenomena. He continues, "This is not to say that
God did not have a role in the creation.""3 5 Whatever the merits of thoughts
about God, they simply have no place in science. "[T]heology can and
must be ruled out as irrelevant" to science, claims Ruse. 6
To understand why Ruse maintains this position, it is helpful to
acknowledge that many philosophers of science, and probably most
research scientists, are committed to methodological naturalism. A
prominent and highly capable spokesperson for this view is Professor
Robert Pennock, an expert witness in Kitzmiller, who explains that
methodological naturalism is an assumption, or methodological rule, for
investigating the natural world.3" 7 Unlike ontological naturalism, which
claims that the material world is all that exists, methodological naturalism
simply assumes that a natural explanation exists for observed phenomena,
and then proceeds by seeking to discover that natural explanation,3 8
According to Pennock, methodological naturalism does not go so far as to
"make a commitment directly to a picture of what exists in the world."30 9
Thus, to state that science "assumes" a natural explanation for natural
phenomena means only that, for purposes of investigation and inquiry,
science seeks a natural explanation. To illustrate, one may seek to explain
why chemotherapy may stop the progression of cancer by assuming that a
naturalistic explanation exists, without taking a position on whether God
Himself heals cancer patients (directly or indirectly).
Observe that methodological naturalism, as articulated by Pennock,
Ruse, and others like them, purports to be facially neutral concerning the
divine. Their description of methodological naturalism suggests that
science does not assert that only a natural explanation exists, that a
supernatural explanation for a natural phenomenon may not complement a
scientific explanation, or that a rival supernatural explanation for a
phenomenon is inferior to the "scientific" explanation.
Thus,
methodological naturalism does not foreclose the possibility that the very
object of scientific inquiry (say, the structure of the human eye) may be
studied and explained (perhaps even in a superior fashion) in some other
discipline, such as religion. Science is simply blind, deaf, and mute
towards the existence (or nonexistence) of God and His activity.
305. Id.
306. Id.at 366.
307. See Robert T. Pennock, Naturalism,Evidence, and Creationism:The Case of Phillip
Johnson, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS, supranote 1, at 77, 83-90.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 84.
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Logically, one might surmise from this description of methodological
naturalism that it assumes only that a natural explanation for an observed
natural phenomenon may exist, not that a natural explanation must exist.
However, the leading philosophers of science who champion
methodological naturalism endorse only the latter assumption.
For
example, Ruse states explicitly that a methodological naturalist "assumes
that the world runs according to unbroken law" and that people "can
understand the world in terms of this law."3' ° Similarly, Pennock writes,
"Lawful regularity is at the very heart of the naturalistic world view and to
say that some power is supernatural is, by definition, to say that it can
violate natural laws."'3 '
In other words, Ruse and Pennock assert that the scientific method
assumes that every natural phenomenon has a solely naturalistic
explanation. If the evidence, no matter how vast, fails to support a
naturalistic explanation for a phenomenon, the scientist may not infer a
nonnaturalistic explanation. Rather, the scientist must continue to assume
that a naturalistic explanation exists and gather additional evidence under
the assumption that a plausible naturalistic explanation will surface.
2. Distinguishing Two Types of Methodological Naturalism
In order to assess whether the courts should accept this articulation of the
scientific method without qualification, it is helpful to return to the question
of what "methodological naturalism" necessarily means. As observed
above, it is theoretically possible that science could commit itself merely to
the assumption that a natural explanation for an observed natural
phenomenon may exist, not that a natural explanation must exist. This
Article will refer to the former as nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism, and to the latter as exclusionary methodological naturalism. A
scientific method based upon nonexclusionary methodological naturalism
would substantively consider natural explanations for all natural
phenomena, but would not ignore the possibility that evidence, discovered
through research, may point to a nonnatural explanation.3 12 In contrast, a
scientific method based upon exclusionary methodological naturalism
would not only consider natural explanations for natural phenomena, but
also would simply disregard the possibility that scientific discoveries may
310. Ruse, supra note 304, at 365.
311. Pennock, supra note 307, at 88.
312. Nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is thus consistent with Dr. Stephen C.
Meyer's appeal for a scientific method employing "metaphysically neutral criteria." See
Stephen C. Meyer, DNA and the Origin of Life, in DARWINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 223,272.
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point to a nonnatural explanation. Both scientific methods would embrace
the same experiments and consider the same evidence. But whereas
researchers following nonexclusionary methodological naturalism would be
free to conclude that the evidence is not explained well in purely
naturalistic terms, the exclusionary methodological naturalist would not
enjoy that freedom. Ruse, Pennock, and those who share their views
endorse only exclusionary methodological naturalism." 3
What is especially noteworthy in the current debate about the nature of
science is that the arguments advanced in favor of exclusionary methodological naturalism do not invalidate nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism.
One argument in favor of exclusionary methodological
naturalism is that it promotes further scientific inquiry.314 By insisting on
the existence of a naturalistic explanation, science keeps looking until (it is
hoped) a natural explanation for a phenomenon under investigation is discovered. Promoting further scientific inquiry is indeed vitally important.
However, science based on nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is
no less likely to continue investigatory research than is science based on
exclusionary methodological naturalism. Because the assumption of nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is that a natural explanation may
indeed surface, there is no reason to cease research.
Unlike the
exclusionary methodological naturalist, however, the nonexclusionary
methodological naturalist is free to publish her tentative conclusions that
the existing evidence points to a nonnatural explanation.
A second argument advanced in favor of exclusionary methodological
naturalism is that it, unlike other methods, produces conclusions that are
falsifiable.3 5 However, the same is true of nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism.
Because nonexclusionary methodological naturalism by
definition is always open to the possibility that a natural explanation for a
phenomenon exists, its inferences that a nonnatural explanation best
explains a phenomenon at any moment is subject to refutation should
additional research suggest a contrary inference.
Additionally, some argue that controlled experiments subject to
replication would be impossible sans the assumption of exclusionary
methodological naturalism." 6 Such experiments, it is argued, require one to
assume that "supernatural entities do not intervene to negate lawful
313. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11.
314. Pennock, supra note 307, at 89-90; Ruse, supra note 304, at 377-78.
315. See Pennock, supra note 307, at 89. For a critique of employing falsifiability as the
defining feature of science, see David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho:
Reconsideringthe Supreme Court's Philosophyof Science, 68 Mo. L. REV. 1, 19-28 (2003).
316. See, e.g., Pennock, supra note 307, at 88-89.
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regularities."3" 7
Again, the argument suffers from overstatement.
Controlled experimentation can take place as long as one assumes that
supernatural entities may not-rather than do not---"intervene to negate
lawful regularities." With the assumption that natural phenomena have the
potential to explain whatever is under investigation, one is free to reach an
inductive inference expressed in naturalistic terms whenever the evidence
so indicates. Nonexclusionary methodological naturalism thus satisfies the
predicate for conducting controlled experiments.
3. Intelligent Design and Methodological Naturalism
The next question, of course, is whether intelligent design is consistent
with either version of methodological naturalism. Intelligent design is
essentially an inference that certain natural phenomena cannot be explained
by purely natural, blind processes.318 Strictly speaking, intelligent design
theory does not expressly state that the intelligent designer is supernatural;
the designer theoretically could be an unknown natural entity.3 19
Nevertheless, if, as intelligent design theorists maintain, specified
complexity points to an intelligent designer, and if that designer is natural,
how could this designer come to be apart from an even superior
intelligence? Under the theory of intelligent design, it is difficult to
conceive how any such natural designer, which surely itself is characterized
by specified complexity, could exist apart from another designer.
Ultimately, therefore, the theory of intelligent design seems to point either
to an infinite regression of "natural" intelligent designers (a logically
troublesome concept), or to a single designer who transcends the natural
realm. Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, the better view is
that intelligent design theory strongly implies, and perhaps even logically
requires under its own terms, at least one supernatural intelligent agent.
The remainder of this Article assumes, without deciding, what some
intelligent design theorists are unwilling to concede-that the logic of
intelligent design necessarily points to a supernatural intelligence. This
Article does not assume that the designer is necessarily "God," but only that
the designer is not a product of purely natural processes-at least not those
317. Id. at 84.
318. See supraPart II.A.2.
319. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN REVOLUTION 189 (2004) (stating that
"the contrast between natural and supernatural causes is the wrong contrast"); DEWOLI,
WEST, LUSKIN & Wirr, supra note 16, at 30-34 (explaining that intelligent design theory
does not rely upon supernatural causation); id. at 35 (stating that "the theory of intelligent
design does not investigate whether the designing intelligent agent was natural or
supernatural").
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known to current science. Under the assumption that the intelligent
designer is not a product of purely natural processes, intelligent design, by
definition, would be inconsistent with exclusionary methodological
naturalism.
However, even under the assumption that intelligent design ultimately
requires a supernatural intelligent agent, the better view is that intelligent
design is consistent with nonexclusionary methodological naturalism. 32 ° To
see why this conclusion is correct, recall that nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism is committed only to the assumption that a
natural explanation may explain a given natural phenomenon. As scientific
inquiry proceeds, along the way the evidence may suggest that a nonnatural
explanation better accounts for a natural phenomenon than a purely
naturalistic explanation. It is at this point that intelligent design theorists
are free to make their case. Intelligent design can be understood as the
articulation of the inference of a nonnatural explanation for scientific
evidence gathered through the scientific process guided by nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism. 3 2' In other words, intelligent design can be
understood as one "inferential phase" in the long process of scientific
inquiry. 32 Because the scientific inquiry is committed to nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism, intelligent design is not necessarily the final
phase of the process. New evidence may later surface to negate the
inference that a natural cause alone cannot plausibly explain the researched
phenomenon.
So understood, even under the contested assumption that intelligent
design requires a supernatural intelligence, intelligent design appears to be
a legitimate part of scientific inquiry. It would cease to be "scientific" only
if it refuses to subject itself to the rigors of critical inquiry posed by
competing theories, or if it maintains positions that are clearly inconsistent
with scientific data. Indeed, intelligent design may illustrate why science

320. My argument that intelligent design theory is consistent with nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism and that, as such, it is not necessarily unscientific merely because
it posits the existence of the supernatural resonates to some degree with how Professor Kent
Greenawalt has argued intelligent design may be taught in the public schools. See
Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 380-81.
321. In stating that intelligent design "can be understood" in this manner, I am not
asserting that it "must be" so understood. As observed previously, see supra note 319, some
intelligent design theorists deny that the theory requires a supernatural intelligent agent.
322. See Stephen C. Meyer, The Explanatory Power of Design: DNA and the Origin of
Information, in MERE CREATION, supra note 1, at 113, 138 (stating that "the design inference
constitutes a provisional, empirically-based conclusion and not a proof (science can provide
nothing more)").
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based on nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is superior to science
based on exclusionary methodological naturalism. Because science based
on exclusionary methodological naturalism is content to assume that a
natural explanation for every element in the natural world must exist, a
scientific theory resulting from this method may find acceptance with little
widespread critical assessment, notwithstanding its implausibility, as long
as it is the best natural theory that one can conceive at the moment. 23 In
contrast, because nonexclusionary methodological naturalism allows for
nonnatural inferences, more-or-less implausible naturalistic theories that are
merely the "best available" at any moment face a greater challenge than
they do under the assumption of exclusionary methodological naturalism.
They essentially face a new rival-such as intelligent design in the origins
debate-that encourages a sense of urgency in discovering more plausible
naturalistic explanations. Thus, science based upon nonexclusionary
methodological naturalism may actually accelerate the discovery of better
naturalistic explanations for observed phenomena.324
V. Two CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

This Part sketches the analysis necessary to answer two crucial
constitutional questions raised by the foregoing discussion. The analysis is
preliminary, and thus lays the foundation for future development. The two
questions are easily stated. First, under what circumstances does the
Establishment Clause permit a governmental body (such as a public school
board) to authorize (or perhaps even require) the teaching of intelligent
design in the public school science classroom? Second, under what
circumstances is a governmental body's decision to prohibit the teaching of
intelligent design unconstitutional?
The analysis in this Part will proceed primarily under both the Lemon
test,325 with a focus on the first two prongs, and Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test.326 The tests will be applied with special attention to how
323. Cf. Meyer, supra note 312, at 271-72 (arguing that theories which are accepted "in
artificially constrained competitions" cannot claim to be the best available).
324. I am certainly open to further philosophical reflection on this subject. I hardly claim
to have mastered the field of the philosophy of science as a predicate for the suggestions in
the text. I merely wish to articulate the concept of nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism, and suggest why it is a sensible, and perhaps even superior, alternative to
exclusionary methodological naturalism. Further, I express no opinion on whether some
version of methodological naturalism is essential to the scientific method.
325. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
326. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
analysis in the text does not consider the coercion test, which was discussed earlier. See
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the neutrality norm should inform the analysis. 3 27 This Article invokes the
neutrality norm for two reasons.3 2' First, a majority of the Court relied
heavily upon the neutrality norm.329 Second, in Epperson v. Arkansas, the
first Supreme Court case to consider the teaching of evolution in the public
schools, the Court emphasized that the religion clauses require
governmental neutrality among religions, and between religion and
nonreligion 3 °
A.

When Does the ConstitutionPermit GovernmentalAdministrators to
Authorize or Require the Teaching of IntelligentDesign?

Assume a science teacher desires to teach intelligent design in the
classroom, and her colleagues discourage her from doing so. The teacher
seeks explicit approval of the public school board for teaching intelligent
design. May the board permit it? Alternatively, the board requires all
science teachers to teach intelligent design as part of the biology
curriculum. May the board do so?
Under the right circumstances, the answer to each question is "yes."
First, for the reasons discussed above, intelligent design theory is not per se
religious. 3
Of course, this conclusion does not end the inquiry.
Determining whether a decision to teach (or require the teaching of)
intelligent design fails the Lemon test, or constitutes governmental
endorsement of religion, requires a court to account for the presence (or
absence) of numerous facts surrounding the decision.
Lemon requires, in relevant part, (1) the board to have adopted the policy
with a secular purpose, and (2) the primary effect of the board's action to
have neither advanced nor inhibited religion.332 Justice O'Connor's
supra text accompanying notes 154-56. That test has been applied only when the
government has sought to compel profession of a religious belief or participation in a
religious ceremony. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
Although one can imagine a situation in which a governmental agent's actions in teaching
origins are coercive, the decisive factor in such circumstances would probably not be a
school board's decision not to offer instruction in intelligent design.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63 for a discussion of the neutrality norm.
328. I am not necessarily implying that the neutrality norm should be the singular
governing norm in all cases raising the Establishment Clause, or even in all cases involving
the teaching of origins. But based upon existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, the neutrality
norm is very important, and must be considered carefully in evaluating the constitutional
issues surrounding instruction in intelligent design.
329. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
330. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
331. See supra Part IV.A.3.
332. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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endorsement test requires that an objective observer, acquainted with all
relevant facts (the text of the policy, the history of the board's decision, and
the implementation of the policy), would not perceive the policy as a state
endorsement of religion.333 Regarding both the first prong of Lemon and
(per Justice O'Connor's endorsement test) the likely perception of an
objective observer of the board's policy, a valid secular purpose could be
the enrichment of the science curriculum. Whether intelligent design
advances science is a controversial question-one upon which this Article
does not unequivocally opine. But given the credentials of intelligent
design advocates334 and the quality of their scholarship,335 it is not
unthinkable that a board could conclude that teaching intelligent design will
better the science curriculum.336 Such a conclusion gives rise to a
legitimate secular purpose under Lemon, and one that would probably be
recognizable as such to an objective observer under the endorsement test.
Other secular purposes are also plausible, including creating a
curriculum that is more theologically neutral--one that is not hostile to
those religious faiths that have something in common with intelligent
design.337 This point must be explored in some detail. In the debate about

333. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
334. For a list of some of the leading theorists associated with intelligent design (and
their promoters), see Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 462-63; and Beckwith,
Science and Religion, supra note 15, at 470-77.
335. Judge Jones' assertion in Kitzmiller that intelligent design has not generated peerreviewed publications, see Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735,
745 (M.D. Pa. 2005), is clearly erroneous. See DEWOLF, WEST, LusKIN & WITT, supra note
16, at 52-53 (discussing peer-reviewed publications supporting intelligent design theory).
336. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 383-84 (arguing that "based on science," one
could say that "intelligent design is one possible component of a full theory of how complex
life developed").
337. See Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344-46 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a valid secular purpose under Lemon includes a school board's desire to
disclaim any orthodoxy of belief that children might infer from an evolution-only biology
curriculum, and its desire to reduce offense that could be caused by teaching evolution). The
FreilerCourt also held, however, that the school board's required disclaimer violated the
"effect" prong of Lemon because its primary effect was "to protect and maintain a particular
religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of creation." Id. at 346. Central to
the court's holding is that the disclaimer required by the school board not only (1)
disavowed any endorsement of evolution and (2) urged students to consider "alternative"
theories of life's origins, but also (3) reminded students that they had the right to maintain
their parents' beliefs and (4) specifically referred only to one alternative theory-the
"Biblical version of Creation." See id. The court found that the disclaimer thereby
encouraged students "to read and meditate upon religion" generally, and "the 'Biblical
version of Creation' in particular. Id. Teaching intelligent design can further the valid
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origins, hostility towards theistic beliefs (especially, but not limited to,
those associated with some forms of special creationism) is not
uncommon. 338 Some leading proponents of naturalistic evolution are
openly hostile towards belief in a Supreme Being. 339 Others publicly argue
that the theory of evolution renders the existence of God all but impossible,
or at least irrelevant. 3 ° Still other opponents of intelligent design make no
claim about the existence of God, but disparage the design movement.
For example, one law student author, forced to concede that intelligent
design does not refer to the Bible, other religious literature, or even God,
and that it makes no claims regarding morality or an afterlife, ironically
concludes that these features of the theory merely reflect "tactics" that
"make it difficult for the Court to classify Intelligent Design as a
3' 42
religion.
secular purposes in Freilerwithout running afoul of the effect prong of Lemon, insofar as
intelligent design is not inherently religious. See BECKWITH, supranote 1, at 63-69.
338. See DEWOLF, WEST, LUSKIN & Wirr, supra note 16, at 60-62 (citing statements of
evolutionary biologists who interpret Darwinian theory to be hostile to theistic beliefs).
339. For example, Richard Dawkins, an outspoken evolutionist, in response to the
question of why some people find "the theistic answer" satisfying at some level, stated as
follows: "Wouldn't it be lovely to believe in an imaginary friend who listens to your
thoughts, listens to your prayers, comforts you, consoles you, gives you life after death, can
give you advice? Of course it's satisfying, if you can believe it. But who wants to believe a
lie?" The Problem with God: Interview with Richard Dawkins, Interview by Laura Sheahen
with Richard Dawkins, Charles Simonyi Professor of the Pub. Understanding of Sci., Oxford
Univ., in Amherst, N.Y. (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.belieffiet.com/story/178/story_17889.
html. Similarly, in response to the question of how he would feel were his daughter to
become religious, Dawkins first recognized her right to choose for herself, and then quipped
that "I think she's much too intelligent to do that." Id.
340. See, eg., DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 5 (3d ed. 1998) ("Darwin
made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous."); DOUGLAS J.
FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EVOLUTION 12-13 (1983) (stating that "the
message of evolution" seems to be that man "was not designed, has no purpose, and is the
product of mere material mechanism").
341. See Beckwith, Public Education,supra note 15, at 509-14.
342. Reule, supra note 245, at 2603. More generally, some have devoted countless hours
of research to document that many vocal supporters of intelligent design have theistic beliefs
and religious motivations for arguing the case for intelligent design. See, e.g., Brauer,
Forrest & Gey, supra note 15, at 27-38. This research influenced the court in Kitzmiller.
See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 719 (M.D. Pa. 2005). This
research is based in part on extensive factual development (which I commend) and deserves
a great deal more critical interaction than I offer in this paper. For now, I briefly note the
following: (1) I agree that many leading proponents of intelligent design are religiously
motivated; (2) I agree that many proponents of intelligent design explicitly state what they
believe to be the religious implications of their theory to religious audiences; and (3) I agree
that some of the leadership in the intelligent design movement seek to garner support from a
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Even those opponents of intelligent design who less blatantly deride the
theory tend to link it to other movements and conflate it with other theories,
all the while attempting to undermine its credibility.343 For example, one
author describes intelligent design as "the third wave of creationism"--the
first being the ban of evolution instruction from the classroom, and the
second being the requirement of teaching creation science alongside
evolution. 3" According to this author, intelligent design satisfied the desire
of creationists "to find another method of teaching that did not so closely
resemble the biblical origins of their movement." '45 The author then
proceeds to analyze the teaching of intelligent design in the context of the
controversial (and subsequently reversed, then reformed and resuscitated)
adoption of revised science education standards by the Kansas State Board
of Education, which standards were crafted in such a way as to permit the
teaching of nonnaturalistic theories of life's origins in the state's public
schools.3" The author reports the deletion of references to the Big Bang
broad spectrum of special creationists. However, (4) the religious motivations of someone
who articulates a scientific theory does not control the question of whether the theory is
inherently religious; (5) opining upon the religious implications of a scientific theory does
not render the theory religious; (6) seeking support from religiously-minded people and
organizations for a scientific theory does not render the theory religious; and (7) intelligent
design theory is not inherently religious (and, more specifically, is not inherently Christian).
This paper addresses the final point in some detail, but a complete development of the
remaining points (and several others) must await another day.
343. Cf Addicott, supra note 15, at 1549 (observing the strategy of lumping all
creationists into "the Fundamentalist camp" of young-earth advocates in order to create
"straw-men"); Campbell, supra note 300, at 16 ("Rather than seeing an educational
opportunity of the first order in the questions raised by contemporary critics of Darwinism
and ID advocates, leaders of the scientific establishment have portrayed all dissent as yet
another head of the hydra of 'fundamentalism."'). Indeed, in his Kitzmiller opinion, Judge
Jones frames his discussion of intelligent design in the context of fundamentalism. See
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 711, 716-17. Given the diverse religious backgrounds of
many prominent intelligent design theorists, and the theory's dissimilarity with religious
objections to evolution often advanced by some fundamentalists, characterizing intelligent
design theory as a version or outgrowth of fundamentalism is unjustified, if not absurd.
344. See Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 620.
345. Id.
346. For a detailed discussion of the original form of the revisions, see Coleen M.
McGrath, Redefining Science to Accommodate Religious Beliefs: The Constitutionality of the
1999 Kansas Science Education Standards, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 297, 309-20 (2000).
Among other controversial features, the nonbinding standards did not encourage students to
understand the key components of large-scale evolution in the life sciences, and the
standards defined "science" as a human activity seeking "logical" (rather than "natural")
explanations for observations of the world. In addition, the Board eliminated coverage of
the origins of life and the universe on certain statewide standardized tests. See id. at 316-19.
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theory (as well as macroevolution) under the revised standards as among
"the most significant victories for advocates of the intelligent design
'
theory."347
In fact, intelligent design is consistent with the Big Bang theory.
Moreover, contrary to the author's apparent viewpoint, the Big Bang is
widely thought to have theistic implications,348 which probably account for
the early atheistic opposition to the theory.349 The author also postulates a
dichotomy between "Darwin's secular theory of biological evolution," and
"the Judeo-Christian theory that a supreme being created the universe. 35 °
However, evolutionary creationism, which embraces biological evolution
(even universal common descent), also embraces the creation of the
universe by a Supreme Being;35 and belief in a Supreme Being is not
unique to Judaism and Christianity.352 In addition, the author contrasts the
scientific estimation of the age of the earth (4.6 billion years) with "the
Bible's view that the earth is only about six thousand years old. 353 This
contrast further distorts the issues. What the Bible teaches regarding the
age of the earth is disputed (even among theologically conservative
Christians, many of whom believe in an old earth),354 and intelligent design
theory does not argue for a young earth. Indeed, leading intelligent design
theorists have openly embraced an old earth.3 55 The author has erroneously
conflated intelligent design with one tenet commonly held among advocates
of a certain type of special creationism--young-earth creationism.
It is possible that ignorance of the many interpretations of Genesis, and a
lack of complete understanding of what intelligent design does and does not
advance, combine to explain such conflations and misdescriptions. It is
also possible that some opponents of intelligent design deliberately
mischaracterize the movement, or at least obfuscate the issues, because of a
These standards were subsequently replaced after they received negative state and national
attention. See id.at 326-29. Revised standards encouraging a more critical analysis of
evolutionary theory were eventually adopted. See Chang, supranote 8.
347. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 622-23.
348. HUGH Ross, THE CREATOR AND THE COSMOS 19-20 (1993).
349. See id.at 81-85.
350. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 624; see also id.at 658 ("Darwin's theory directly
contradicts the biblical story of creation.").
351. See supranotes 94-104 and accompanying text.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
353. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 626.
354. This issue relates to the interpretive debate over the meaning of the word "day" in
Genesis, which has already been discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
355. See, e.g., BEHE, supra note 42, at 5; David Berlinski, The Deniable Darwin, in
DARwINISM, DESIGN, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 157, 158 (referring to the
Cambrian era as "a brief 600 million years ago").
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latent hostility to all things that hint of the divine-even to scientifically
based conclusions concerning the existence of an intelligent designer who
may just be the God revealed in the Bible. If a school board concludes that
the rather common attacks on intelligent design (and religious views at least
partly consistent with intelligent design) create a climate that is hostile to
certain religious faiths, the desire to remove such hostility from the public
schools by teaching about intelligent design is a valid secular purpose under
Lemon, and one that ought not be perceived by an objective observer to
endorse religion under the endorsement test.356
It is also probable that, under some common circumstances, the board's
decision to authorize the teaching of intelligent design would have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion (within the
meaning of the second prong of Lemon). On the one hand, intelligent
design does not require a belief in any religious faith. On the other,
whereas evolution (qua exclusive agency of biological change) is
inconsistent with certain religious claims, intelligent design is not
inconsistent with those claims. Perhaps more importantly, as long as
intelligent design is taught in conjunction with evolutionary theory, it is
likely that the curriculum which offers both theories is more neutral as
between religion and nonreligion than a curriculum that teaches only
evolutionary theory.357
The kind of argument typically advanced against teaching intelligent
design in the public school science classroom is unpersuasive. Consider the
following line of reasoning advanced by an opponent of intelligent design:
Creationists believe that there are only two positions regarding the
origins of life and of the earth: the Genesis story of creation or
evolution. If the creationists on the [state school board], an arm of
the government, discredit the theory of evolution in the science
classroom, then by logical syllogism, they automatically credit the
theory of creationism, the story told in the Bible. One cannot
imagine a clearer example of a governmental endorsement of
religion.35

356. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. This argument holds only if intelligent
design is a valid scientific inference. If it is not, it has no place in the public school science
classroom. A school should not attempt to combat religious hostility in the science
classroom by offering nonscientific arguments that are friendly to religion.
357. See infra notes 383-400.
358. Rosenberg, supra note 256, at 674 (footnotes omitted).
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The author has hardly offered a clear example of endorsement. First, as
discussed above,359 there are certainly more than "two positions" on origins
conceived by those who may be called "creationists." The gamut ranges
from young-earth creationists, who apparently reject any form of large scale
evolution, to evolutionary creationists, who embrace natural selection and
most, if not all, of the notion of universal common descent. The example
does not illuminate which view has been endorsed. Second, as discussed
above, 360 many religions hold to a creator. Which one has been endorsed?
Intelligent design itself endorses no particular religion's understanding of
the creator. Third, if the author's implicit position ultimately is that some
religious concept of theism (monotheism, polytheism, or perhaps even
pantheism) is necessarily endorsed by intelligent design, even that
conclusion is highly dubious.
As discussed above, some purely
philosophical schools hold to an Ultimate Cause,' and it is far from clear
that intelligent design theory can be attributed to religious notions of a God
or gods to any greater degree than to philosophical notions of God.
The opinion of Judge Jones in Kitzmiller suffers from a similar
weakness. In analyzing the endorsement test, he writes that an objective
adult observer in the Dover area "would also be presumed to know that ID
and teaching about supposed gaps and problems in evolutionary theory are
creationist religious strategies that evolved from earlier forms of
creationism. '362 If teaching about "supposed gaps and problems" in
orthodox evolutionary theory is merely a creationist religious strategy, we
can now relegate notable nontheistic icons of evolutionary theory, such as
'
Harvard's Stephen J. Gould, to the camp of "creationists."363
Professor
359. See supra Part II.B.1.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 262-277.
362. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 731 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
Supposed gaps and problems? Every accomplished evolutionary scientist is well aware that
there are difficulties, or at least unknowns, in the theory of evolution. See, e.g., E.N.K.
CLARKSON, INVERTEBRATE PALAEONTOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 45 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that
the emergence of higher taxa "remains the least understood of palaeontological phenomena";
opining that additional knowledge of the genome should offer "more of an insight into this
most critical yet most elusive of all aspects of evolution"). The debate centers on whether
those difficulties and unknowns can be explained only by reference to natural processes, and
whether they are of great concern, not whether they are simply "supposed." Comments like
those offered by Judge Jones do not bode well for the rigor or persuasiveness of his opinion.
363. As noted previously, Dr. Gould was critical of certain aspects of orthodox neoDarwinian thought. See supra note 22. Gould's theory, advanced originally in a paper
coauthored with Niles Eldridge, is known as punctuated equilibrium. See KENNETH R.
MILLER, FINDING DARWIN'S GOD 82-88 (1999) (discussing that the fossil record negates the
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Gould would have protested,3" and the notion is just silly. Judge Jones's
summary statement suggests that he himself subscribes to a false duality
(i.e., that to critique accepted understandings of evolution is to reject it
outright and embrace only some form of special creationism) similar to that
which the McLean court attributed to "creation science. 365
Certainly, one can readily imagine situations in which a decision to teach
intelligent design is unconstitutional under existing precedent,36 6 and this
Article does not imply anything to the contrary. For example, assume a
school board debates in a public meeting whether to require teachers to
present young-earth creationism to students in the same unit of study that
they are taught the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Several school board
members express their beliefs that the Bible supports young-earth
creationism, the Bible is true, and any version of evolution should be
refuted with evidence for a young earth. Legal counsel at the board
meeting then tells the school board that requiring this "balanced treatment"
has been held unconstitutional. Because the Court has not yet addressed the
teaching of intelligent design, however, legal counsel opines that the school
could adopt a resolution authorizing and encouraging teachers to present the
theory of intelligent design to their students. The school board so resolves.
Assuming these facts, under existing Supreme Court precedent applying
either the Lemon test or the endorsement test, a court should find the action
of the school board unconstitutional.367
In summary, the question of whether intelligent design can be taught in
the public school science classroom necessarily depends on the facts of
gradualistic Darwinian account of the development of species, and instead points to long
periods of gradual development which are "punctuated" with brief periods of rapid
expansion of new species).
364. MILLER, supranote 363, at 170 (describing an interview in which Gould said that it
is comforting "if you can delude yourself into thinking that there's all some warm and fuzzy
meaning to [life] ... [b]ut I do think it's just a story we tell ourselves").
365. See generally McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
366. Cf Luskin, supra note 15, at 597 (observing that "intent matters for those teaching
intelligent design").
367. Thus, if Judge Jones's findings of fact in Kitzmiller (regarding the events
surrounding the school board's decision to require the reading in school of the prepared
statement) are correct, he had adequate grounds for concluding that the school board's
actions violated the Establishment Clause under existing Supreme Court case law. See
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 746-63. There was evidence that a religious purpose (rather
than the goal of enhancing science education) drove the board's official actions, see id., and
under the Court's current approach for determining purpose, it is reasonable to find a
violation of the first prong of Lemon.
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each case. Consistent with this observation, and contrary to the conclusion
of the district court in Kitzmiller,368 a court must not strike down a decision
to teach intelligent design merely because it, like many religious faiths,
posits an intelligent designer. The state does not offend the Establishment
Clause merely by enacting a law that favors or disfavors conduct, or rests
upon some notion that is forbidden, discouraged, encouraged, or embraced
by one or more religious faiths. That the United States criminalizes murder,
theft, and perjury-all of which are prohibited by the Ten
Commandments-does not mean that the state has codified Judaism,
Christianity, or both. This much the Supreme Court has acknowledged,369
and the point is especially apropos in the origins debate.
B. When Does the ConstitutionProhibitGovernment Administratorsfrom
Forbiddingthe Teaching of IntelligentDesign?
Assume a science teacher desires to teach intelligent design in the
classroom, but a school board attempts to forbid the teacher from doing so.
The better view is that in some cases, the school board would be
constitutionally justified in prohibiting instruction in intelligent design. For
example, if the school board's decision rests exclusively upon a reasoned,
informed determination that intelligent design is simply a poor scientific
theory, and if the school board is careful to avoid sending any message of
approval or disapproval of any theological concept of origins, the board's
decision would likely pose no constitutional problems. Nevertheless, in
some cases the board's decision may be constitutionally suspect. This part
of the Article discusses circumstances in which the Establishment Clause
probably does, or at least arguably may, prevent a school board from
forbidding the teaching of intelligent design.
If the board's stated reason for its action is that intelligent design must
not be taught because of its religious implications, the board's action may
run afoul of the First Amendment. The discussion above establishes that
intelligent design theory is not inherently religious; it merely coincides with
many different religious and philosophical beliefs. 7 To forbid the teaching
of intelligent design on account of such coincidence, while simultaneously
permitting or mandating the teaching of evolution (qua exclusive agency of
biological change) notwithstanding its coincidence with religious beliefs, is

368. Seeid. at 716-23.
369. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
370. See supraPart IV.A.3.
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hardly consistent with the neutrality norm.37' The board's action also may
be suspect under the leading Establishment Clause tests.
First, the board's decision may reflect a deliberate bias against
monotheistic religious beliefs, or at least those that hold to some form of a
special creation, giving rise to a violation of the first prong of Lemon.
Statements of disdain for those who hold to certain forms of special
creation are not at all uncommon.372 Although intelligent design certainly
does not even touch upon many of the tenets of various forms of special
creationism, it nonetheless has one element in common with all forms-an
agent of design. If the board's decision represents an effort to prevent
schoolchildren from hearing scientific evidence that even remotely implies
the plausibility of some religious view that members of the board disfavor,
the board's action violates the first prong of Lemon.373 Moreover, if an
objective observer would perceive the board's decision as the disapproval
of religion, the decision violates the endorsement test. 374 This conclusion
holds even if the stated reason of the board is secular (for example, that the
scientific case for intelligent design is weak). A court must examine all of
the facts to determine whether hostility towards religious belief is the real
explanation for the government's decision. Both religion clauses forbid
"covert suppression of particular religious beliefs. 375 A school board's
secular public justification for a decision to forbid the teaching of
intelligent design may well constitute a thinly veiled attempt to suppress
religiously grounded beliefs about human origins.

371. See Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 489-90 (arguing that forbidding
instruction in intelligent design while permitting or requiring the teaching of evolution may
violate religious neutrality). Even some opponents of teaching intelligent design in the
science classroom acknowledge that banning it entirely (while requiring the teaching of
evolutionary theory) may alienate a significant portion of the population. See, e.g., Wexler,
supra note 15, at 849.
372. To illustrate, Richard Dawkins has claimed that "if you meet somebody who claims
not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid, or insane (or wicked, but I'd
rather not consider that)." See House, supra note 15, at 387 n.120.
373. Cf Arianne Ellerbe, Comment, We Didn't Start the Fire: The Origins Science Battle
Rages On More Than 75 Years After Scopes, 64 LA. L. REv. 589, 606 (2004) (arguing that
refusing to allow presentation of alternative theories of origins may "indicate a hostility and
intolerance toward religion instead of maintaining a spirit of neutrality").
374. Of course, that a scientific theory (such as evolution by means of natural selection)
tends to conflict with a religious viewpoint (such as young-earth creationism) does not alone
render the theory unconstitutional. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 385.
375. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)).
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Second, even if the board's purpose is legitimately secular (e.g., to
concentrate instruction on topics that the board considers more important
than intelligent design), the board's decision in some circumstances may
still present constitutional difficulties. The second prong of Lemon asks, in
relevant part, whether the primary effect of the board's action is to inhibit
religion.376 It could be. The explanation lies in the core of how Charles
Darwin understood his theory theologically, and how subsequent
generations perceive his theory to have theological content.
Consider the following words of Darwin: "There seems to be no more
design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural
selection, than in the course which the wind blows: Everything in nature is
the result of fixed laws. 377 Similarly, Darwin disclosed that, although he
"had no intention to write atheistically," he nonetheless did not plainly see
"evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us."37 Rather, he
3 79
observed "much misery in the world.
The perceptive eye cannot ignore that Darwin is doing something that
science, based upon exclusionary methodological naturalism, prohibits: he
is offering theological speculation. Darwin is not simply arguing that
"fixed laws" explain nature. He is arguing that natural processes (such as
natural selection) reflect no design. This position is, of course, consistent
with Darwin's deistic position. But for present purposes, what matters is
that Darwin is taking a theological stance. It is one thing to assert that
natural processes can explain all biological life; it is another thing to assert
that God does not design through those processes. The latter view cannot
be established through mere observation of evidence. Moreover, to assert
that natural processes lack design is to refute a common theological
conception of a God who works through or upon His creation. In other
words, Darwin is not simply denying that God necessarily acts by means of
special creation; he is denying that God actively "designs" through
evolution.
Darwin's theological views are interesting for two reasons. First,
theological speculation is inconsistent with science based on exclusionary
methodological naturalism, at least according to its leading proponents.
Professor Ruse, for example, states that the methodological naturalist
"avoid[s] all theological or other religious references."3 ° Again he writes,
376. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
377. CHARLES DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARwiN 1809-1882, at 87

(Nora Barlow ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1958) (1887).
378. BLAcKmoRE & PAGE, supra note 127, at 118.
379. Id.
380. Ruse, supra note 304, at 365.
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"[S]cience has no place for talk of God." '' Further, "if one goes to a
scientist one does not expect any advice on or reference to theological
matters. 382 Under these standards, Darwin's views of evolution are not (at
least not consistently) scientific.
Second, Darwin's theology poses a problem for contemporary science
education in the public schools, for Darwin has deeply affected how
evolutionists understand evolution.383
Certainly, as argued above,
evolution-even evolution qua universal common descent-is not
inherently religious .3 4 Neither does the theory standing alone require that
one take a position on how much, if at all, God has used evolution. But
evolution is not taught in a vacuum. It is taught in an educational tradition
that properly credits Darwin with having made the greatest contributions to
evolutionary theory. Like it or not, how Darwin understood evolutionincluding his theology-influences how many understand evolution and its
implications,38 5 and how it is presented in high school textbooks.386 It is no
surprise that many outspoken evolutionists openly embrace atheistic
evolution 387 -as do many research biologists. 38 8 Nor is it surprising that

381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Cf MILLER, supra note 363, at 167 (opining that the reason less than half of
Americans believe that humans evolved from earlier species is the majority's "well-founded
belief that the concept of evolution is used routinely, in the intellectual sense, to justify and
advance a philosophical worldview that they regard as hostile and even alien to their lives
and values").
384. See supraPart IV.A.2.
385. See, e.g., Ernst Mayr, Darwin'sInfluence on Modern Thought, Sci. AM., July 2000,
at 78, 81 ("Darwinism rejects all supernatural phenomena and causations. The theory of
evolution by natural selection explains the adaptedness and diversity of the world solely
materialistically.").
386. For examples of subtle (and not so subtle) theological descriptions of evolution in
textbooks, see Meyer & Keas, supra note 20, at 142.
387. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 132-33 (1995) (arguing that the
"universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect" for one governed
by a strictly materialistic evolutionary process), quoted in MILLER, supra note 363, at 171.
388. A recent survey described at a meeting of the Association for the Sociology of
Religion reports that, among 1,646 scholars at twenty-one leading research universities who
represent experts in three natural sciences and four social sciences, the most "irreligious"
field was biology. See David Glenn, Religious Belief Is Found to Be Less Lacking Among
Social Scientists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 2005, http://chronicle.com/daily/2005/08/
2005081504n.htm. Over 63% of biologists identified themselves as agnostics or atheists.
Id. This high percentage compares with 55.4% for the combined fields of physics,
chemistry, and biology. See id
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some claim to be atheists precisely because they fully embrace evolution.389
They are simply following the Darwinian tradition of denying that God
designs through evolution, and taking his deistic understanding to the next
level-an atheistic understanding.
In view of the influence of Darwin on evolutionary thought, it would not
be surprising for public school students (whose opinions are significantly
shaped by their parents and the media) to assume the possibility that a
curriculum advancing evolution (qua exclusive agency of biological
change) subsumes Darwin's theological position. A school board's
decision to prohibit instruction in intelligent design could suggest that this
theoretical possibility is a practical reality, particularly when instructors are
not -careful in teaching students that Darwin's theological views are not
essential elements of the scientific theory of evolution. The effect may well
be (1) to dissuade students from forming their own religious opinions
independently, or even (2) to cause students to alter their existing religious
views. In either case, the state has inhibited religion, and may have failed
the Lemon test. Moreover, under Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, a
reasonable observer could perceive state endorsement of a theological
position (deistic or atheistic evolution) on these facts.39 °
An additional problem exists.
As discussed previously, some
philosophers of science argue that intelligent design is not "scientific"
because it violates exclusionary methodological naturalism. 9 ' Let us now
set aside the problem that Darwin's version of evolution also violates
science based upon exclusionary methodological naturalism in that
Darwinism takes a position on God's involvement in nature. Let us
imagine that all high school teachers, and all textbooks, could successfully
and consistently discuss the limits of scientific methodology. If the
389. Consider the words of biologist David Hull, writing in what is widely viewed as a
respectable scientificjournal:
Whatever the God implied by evolutionary theory and the data of natural
history may be like, He is not the Protestant God of waste not, want not. He is
also not a loving God who cares about His productions. He is not even the
awful God portrayed in the book of Job. The God of the GalApagos is careless,
wasteful, indifferent, almost diabolical. He is certainly not the sort of God to
whom anyone would be inclined to pray.
David Hull, The God of the Gahipagos, 352 NATURE 486 (1991) (reviewing PHLLIP E.
JOHNSON, DARwIN ON TRIAL (1991)), quoted in MILLER, supra note 363, at 185.
390. The Establishment Clause prohibits the state from dictating curriculum on religious
grounds. A governmental body that expressly prohibits the teaching of intelligent design
because it violates the theological position of Darwin should be found to have violated the
First Amendment (specifically, the purpose prong of Lemon).
391. See supra text accompanying notes 303-11.
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exclusionary version of methodological naturalism were carefully
articulated, broadly communicated, and consistently employed by scientists
who are committed to it, perhaps the origins controversy would be less
volatile than it is today. Biologists who believe in evolution by natural
selection (and in universal common descent) would advance the theory as
the best theory produced by exclusionary methodological naturalism.
However, by virtue of the self-imposed limitations of exclusionary
methodological naturalism, evolutionary biologists would have some
difficulty saying, "this theory is the most probable theory of origins," let
alone "this theory is the only serious explanation of origins," or "this is
what we know to be true." Such statements are in tension with the claim of
exclusionary methodological naturalism that it is deaf and mute towards
theories that are not limited to purely naturalistic explanations.
But even such careful qualification of the limits of exclusionary
methodological naturalism may not avoid all constitutional problems. The
theory of evolution (qua exclusive agency of biological change) purportedly
follows from the assumption that God serves no active role in nature.392
One may rightly question whether the state, through science education or
any other program, generally has any business making any limiting
assumptions about God or propounding theories that purport to be based
solely on such limiting assumptions. This point is especially pressing when
the assumption, like exclusionary methodological naturalism, is
inconsistent with many religious conceptions of origins.
Confining to mere methodology the assumption that God is unnecessary
to explain any natural phenomenon does not necessarily avoid
constitutional concerns. At a minimum, the assumption means that the
observation of natural phenomena can never necessarily suggest a
supernatural explanation. In other words, exclusionary methodological
naturalism as articulated by its leading proponents implies that the scientific
study of creation can never discern the presence of a creator. This
assumption (upon which science is said to rest) is largely inconsistent with
the Biblical teaching (as understood by many) that the creation points to a
Creator.393 Robert Newman speaks for many when he writes as follows:
Theology studies God's special revelation in Scripture, while
science studies God's general revelation in nature. If biblical
Christianity is true (as I believe), then the God who cannot lie has
392. This observation does not mean that the theory of evolution requires a belief that
God serves no active role in nature. My point is simply that advocates of exclusionary
methodological naturalism believe that evolutionary theory follows from that assumption.
393. See, e.g., Psalm 19:1-6; Romans 1:19-20.
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revealed himself both in nature and in Scripture. Thus, both
science and theology should provide input to an accurate view of
reality, and we may expect them to overlap in many areas.394
The relevant point is not that the Biblical teaching on general revelation
is true (although I believe it is). Rather, the point is that exclusionary
methodological naturalism-a philosophical position-contradicts (or at
least is in great tension with) a common Biblical understanding of general
revelation.395 As argued above, there may very well be no good secular
reason for science to embrace exclusionary methodological naturalism, as
opposed to nonexclusionary methodological naturalism.
If so, a
government that endorses exclusionary methodological naturalism
needlessly endorses a philosophy that largely, if not entirely, defies a
religious viewpoint. This is hardly consistent with the neutrality norm.396
As the Court in McCreary County stated, religious neutrality is the
'
"central Establishment Clause value."397
Government should not embrace
an assumption that violates this value when acceptable alternatives that are
more neutral are available. Nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is
indeed more neutral. Insofar as nonexclusionary methodological naturalism
assumes only that a natural explanation may exist for natural phenomena, it
tolerates an inference that a nonnatural explanation may also explain such
phenomena, perhaps even better (at any given point in time). Thus,
nonexclusionary methodological naturalism is not hostile to theological
perspectives, but at the same time offers theological viewpoints no
preference.
This discussion suggests that presenting the theory of evolution as
"merely" the product of exclusionary methodological naturalism may not
avoid an Establishment Clause violation (although articulating the
methodological assumption behind the theory is probably better than
veiling such an assumption).
The assumption of exclusionary
methodological naturalism is itself problematic. The solution is to adopt a
different methodological assumption-nonexclusionary methodological
naturalism. Plainly, evolution through natural selection, as well as
universal common descent, can be presented as features of evolutionary
394. Newman, supranote 90, at 117.
395. For a thoughtfil discussion of the scope and limits of natural theology, see ALLISTER
E. McGRATH, CusTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 208-19 (3d ed. 2001).
396. Cf Beckwith, Public Education, supra note 15, at 502-03 (arguing that teaching
only one theory of origins may violate neutrality, in part because it "presupposes a
controversial epistemology (methodological naturalism)").
397. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
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theory produced through nonexclusionary methodological naturalism. But
such theories could not be presented as the only theories produced by the
scientific method. The door would be left open for an inference of
nonnatural explanations. If the state "shuts the door" on all such theories
merely because they appear to have supernatural implications, the state may
have violated the Establishment Clause.
The constitutional concern is especially heightened in the context of
public secondary education. As the Court observed in Edwards v.
Aguillard, families "condition their trust" in public education "on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and
'
his or her family."398
Students are "impressionable. ' 39 The "coercive
power" of the government is great because of compulsory attendance laws,
the tendency of students to emulate teachers, and the susceptibility of
children to peer pressure.4 °0 Such factors reinforce the conclusion that
government ought not present science as a discipline that makes sense only
if one assumes the noninvolvement of supernatural forces (including God)
in nature.
In summary, a decision to prohibit the teaching of intelligent design
merely because it is minimally consistent with certain religious conceptions
of biological origins and development would violate the first prong of
Lemon. Further, a decision to prohibit the teaching of intelligent design
may be unconstitutional in some local contexts even if the decision is not
grounded in an unconstitutional purpose. First, given the theological
content ascribed to the theory of evolution on account of Darwin's deistic
understanding of the theory, requiring the teaching of evolution while
prohibiting the teaching of intelligent design in some circumstances may
violate the effect prong of Lemon, and may cause a reasonable observer to
perceive governmental disapproval of religious conceptions of origins
which are inconsistent with evolution qua exclusive agency of biological
change. Second, presenting the theory of evolution as merely the product
of exclusionary methodological naturalism is itself constitutionally suspect,
insofar as exclusionary methodological naturalism is a philosophical
position that is not scientifically compelled, but is in tension with certain
theological assumptions about the nature of creation.

398. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
399. Id.
400. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The question of whether intelligent design can be taught in public school
science classrooms (or banished from them) without violating the
Establishment Clause is much more complicated than many would have us
believe. This Article has argued that intelligent design survives an analysis
of two critical threshold questions. First, a strong case exists that intelligent
design theory is not inherently religious. Second, intelligent design
probably does not fail to qualify as "scientific" merely because it may be
understood to require (or at least strongly imply) supernatural agency. The
former conclusion is supported by Supreme Court precedent, an informed
view of theology and philosophy, and logic. The latter conclusion is
supported (though less plainly) by an appropriate philosophy of science and
a preference for not limiting science so as to offend the constitutional norm
of religious neutrality.
Thus, under the right circumstances, that intelligent design can be taught
in public school science courses is conceivable. Moreover, in some
circumstances, a governmental actor's refusal to teach (or to allow the
teaching of) intelligent design may violate the Establishment Clause.
However, these conclusions do not mean that intelligent design must be
taught in the public schools uniformly across the nation, or even that it
should be so taught. Whether intelligent design theory should be taught
necessarily depends not only upon whether it qualifies as science, but also
upon whether it is good science. This Article addresses only one aspect of
the first contingency (i.e., whether science necessarily must avoid
supernatural references), and expresses no view on the second.
Consequently, this Article neither resolves, nor attempts to resolve, the
debate stirring over intelligent design.
Nonetheless, this Article does contribute importantly to the constitutional
debate over teaching intelligent design in the public schools. At a
minimum, the analysis supports the following propositions. First, courts
must not dismiss intelligent design as merely the latest version of Biblical
creationism masquerading in scientific terminology. On the other hand,
courts must continue to scrutinize curricular offerings that purport to teach
intelligent design in public schools; a danger exists that governmental
actors will mislabel Biblical creationism as "intelligent design" with hopes
of circumventing Supreme Court precedent. Second, intelligent design
should force courts to ponder deeply the constitutional implications of
teaching a theory characterized by a concept that is simultaneously
scientific and potentially theological. Finally, educators who have a
thorough understanding of intelligent design theory and who in good faith
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desire to enrich the public school science curriculum by teaching it should
not hesitate to do so. Teaching the theory is sure to prompt litigation, but
our country should welcome such litigation. Intelligent design merits a fair
day in court. May an informed community of educators hasten that day.
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